For those unable to attend in person, today's event, "50 Years Since the Six Day War" will be available for remote viewing here, beginning at 1730.  In Hebrew.

Dr. Itamar Radai, the Academic Director of the Konrad Adeanuer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation at the Moshe Dayan Center,  presented a paper entitled, "Jaffa, Bride of the Sea?" at the 20th Annual Mediterranean Studies Association Congress held in Valleta, Malta from 31 May-3 June 2017.

Head of Africa Studies at the MDC, Dr. Irit Back, appeared on the "International Hour" on 5 June 2016, where she spoke about Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's recent visit to western Africa. In Hebrew.

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לקריסת מחירי הנפט בין השנים 2012 עד 2014 היו השפעות משמעותיות על המפיקים ועל הצרכנים כאחד. מאמר זה יבחן חלק מההשפעות על יצרני הנפט במפרץ.

החשיבות האסטרטגית של מדינות המפרץ בשווקי האנרגיה הבינלאומיים מתערערת בשל שינויים בהיצע ובביקוש לנפט. בתחום ההיצע ישנם מקורות אנרגיה חדשים ממדינות שאינן חברות ארגון המדינות המייצאות נפט (אופ"ק)  הנכנסים לשוק, בעיקר בעקבות הפקת פצלי נפט (Shale Oil) בארה"ב. בתחום הביקוש, יכולתן של מדינות המפרץ לייצא נפט נתונה לאיום בשל העלייה בצריכת הנפט המקומית. הדבר השתקף בירידה חדה בהכנסות מייצוא נפט של מדינות המועצה לשיתוף פעולה במפרץ (GCC), שפחתו מ-796 מיליארד דולר ב-2012, ל-368 מיליארד דולר ב-2015. ב-2016, הן ירדו עוד יותר בכ-16.5%, ועמדו על כ-307 מיליארד דולר.

בעוד שמחירי הנפט נותרו גבוהים, גדל התמריץ למצוא מקורות אנרגיה נוספים, ליצירת תחליפים או להצגת טכנולוגיות המגדילות את יעילות האנרגיה. בשנות ה-70', עלתה הפקת  הנפט בים הצפוני מאחר שמחירי הנפט הגבוהים הפכו את ההשקעה בטכנולוגיה חדשה למשתלמת. מחירי הנפט הגבוהים הפחיתו את הביקוש לנפט, ובו זמנית הגדילו את ההיצע. התוצאה הייתה קריסה במחירי הנפט בין השנים 1981 ל-1986 של מעל ל-60%, וכך גם בהכנסות אופ"ק. ערב הסעודית שינתה אז את מדיניות הנפט שלה והחליטה שאינה מנסה עוד לאזן את עודפי ההפקה של חברי הארגון (לדוגמה, הפקה  העולה על מכסותיהן), באמצעות קיצוץ בתפוקה.

בין השנים 2002 ל-2011, עלו מחירי הנפט פי חמישה, בעיקר בשל העלייה בביקוש בסין ובמדינות אסייתיות אחרות. כתוצאה מהעלייה במחירי הנפט, נכנסו לשוק מקורות חדשים של נפט; הפעם היו אלה פצלי נפט, בעיקר מארצות הברית. הייצור הגולמי של ארצות הברית עלה מ-5 מיליון חביות ליום ב--2008 ל- 9.4 מיליון חביות ליום ב-2015, אך פחת שוב ל-8.8 מיליון חביות ליום ב-2016. בשנת 2014, חזרה ארה"ב להיות יצרנית הנפט הגדולה בעולם, ועקפה את ערב הסעודית. בדצמבר 2015, הקונגרס האמריקאי ביטל את האיסור בן 40 השנה על מרבית יצוא הנפט.

בשעה שהייצור המקומי צמח, צנח יבוא הנפט האמריקאי משיא של  13.7 מיליון חביות ליום בשנת 2005 לכדי 9.4 מיליון חביות ליום ב-2015. יצוא הנפט האמריקאי, לעומת זאת,  עלה מ-1.3 מיליון חביות ליום בשנת 2005 ל-4.7 מיליון חביות ליום  ב-2015. ההודעה על הביטול החלקי של האיסור לייצא נפט עודדה פיתוח נוסף של פצלי נפט. התפתחויות טכנולוגיות לא רק איפשרו הפקה של פצלי נפט וגז, אלא גם הפכו אותה למהירה יותר.

בנובמבר 2016, בתגובה לירידה במחירי הנפט, החזירו מדינות אופ"ק מחדש את מכסות הייצור. הן הסכימו לקיצוץ בהפקה והשיגו הסכם עם מפיקים מרכזיים במדינות שאינן שייכות לארגון, בראשן רוסיה, לפיו גם הם יקצצו בתפוקה. התוצאה הייתה עלייה של כ-20% במחירי הנפט בנובמבר ובדצמבר 2016, שהביאו לכך שערכה של חבית נפט עמד על 51 דולר. ואולם, זהו מחיר שעודנו נמוך בכמחצית ממחיר השיא בשנת 2012. ערב הסעודית הייתה זקוקה למחירי נפט גבוהים על מנת להביא לקידום וגיוון כלכלתה, אך במידה מסוימת גם בכדי להפריט את חברת הנפט שבבעלות המדינה, חברת ארמקו ((Saudi Aramco. מחירי נפט גבוהים עשויים היו להגדיל את ערכה של חברת הנפט ולעודד רכישה של מניות החברה, שתוכננו במסגרת התוכנית הסעודית "חזון 2030". באופן אירוני, הממלכה זקוקה להכנסות גבוהות יותר מנפט על מנת לממן פיתוח של כלכלה בעלת תלות נמוכה בנפט. מדינות אופ"ק הניחו כי קיצוץ מתון בתפוקה מלווה בעלייה במחירי הנפט, יעודד השקעות במקורות חדשים של נפט גולמי שימנעו מחסור בנפט בעתיד.

כתוצאה ממחירי נפט נמוכים, תפוקת הנפט של ארה"ב פחתה בכ-6% ב-2016. בחודשיים הראשונים של 2017 היא עלתה שוב, ככל הנראה בתגובה להחלטת מדינות אופ"ק. יכולתה של ארה"ב לווסת את תפוקת הנפט משמעותה כנראה שמחירי הנפט ימשיכו להיות נמוכים לאורך זמן. אחת ההערכות לגבי רזרבות פצלי הנפט של ארצות הברית היא שהן משתוות לרזרבות הנפט הקונבנציונלי המשוערות של ערב הסעודית ורוסיה ביחד.

מדינות ה-GCC אינן המפיקות היחידות במפרץ. גם עיראק ואיראן הן מפיקות גדולות, וכל אחת מהן היא סיפור בפני עצמו. איראן הפיקה 3.8 מיליון חביות ליום במרץ 2017, שהיוו כ-17% מעל רמת התפוקה במרץ 2016. על פי ההסכם עם אופ"ק מנובמבר 2016, היא הורשתה להעלות את התפוקה ל-3.8 מיליון חביות ליום, והגיעה כמעט לרמה זו כבר ברבעון הראשון של 2017.

ייצוא הנפט הגולמי האיראני הגיע ל-2.2 מיליון חביות ליום במרץ 2017, וכמעט כל הנפט של המדינה המאוחסן בים – שהיה ברובו דחוס - נמכר. לפני ההקלות בסנקציות בתחילת 2016, אחסנה איראן כמויות עצומות של נפט שאינו נמכר במכליות בים. באוקטובר 2016, 13 מכליות שהכילו כ-26 מיליון חביות נפט דחוס של חברת South Pars Gas צפו לאורך חופיה של איראן. בסוף מרץ 2017, נותרו 4 מיליון חביות, וההנחה היא שמרבית הנפט נמכר באסיה.

הייצור העיראקי, כולל זה המגיע מהממשלה האזורית של כורדיסטאן (KRG) היה יציב ועמד על 4.4 מיליון חביות ליום במרץ 2017. למרות ההקלות החלקיות במשלוחי נפט גולמי לשווקי העולם הם עמדו על 3.77 מיליון חביות ליום, וכמויות מסוימות של נפט גולמי הועברו לאחסון בדרום המחוז, בעוד הצריכה המקומית בכורדיסטאן עלתה. יצוא הנפט בצינור לטורקיה פחת לכדי 560,000 חביות ליום.

ענף הנפט הכורדי התמודד עם מכשול נוסף כאשר חברת ג'נל אנרג'י (Genel Energy), המחזיקה ברזרבות ובמקורות הנפט הגדולים ביותר בכורדיסטאן, הצהירה על ירידה משמעותית נוספת ברזרבות בשדה המרכזי טק טק (Taq Taq). הרזרבות המוכחות והמשוערות בסוף פברואר 2017 הוערכו בכ-59 מיליון חביות - ירידה מ-172 מיליון חביות בסוף 2015. הימצאות מים בבארות מרכזיות גרמו לצניחה בתפוקת הנפט.

הממשלה הפדרלית העיראקית מבקשת להגביר את היקף התפוקה שלה לכדי 5 מיליון חביות ליום בשנת 2017 והיא מתאמצת לדבוק בהסכם ההיצע של אופ"ק. לשם כך, היא בוחנת את תנאי החוזים שלה במטרה ליישר קו בין האינטרסים של חברות הנפט הבינלאומיות ושל הממשלה. חברות הנפט הבינלאומיות התלוננו על שולי רווח נמוכים מאז שהחלו לעבוד על פרויקטים ענקיים בדרום המדינה בשנת 2010. הסכמי השירות הפורעים את כל עלויות ההפעלה וההון יחד עם תשלומי האגרות אינם מעודדים חברות זרות להגביל את ההוצאות. מחירי הנפט הנמוכים יותר מעמידים במבחן את יכולתה של בגדד להגיע לדרישת ההכנסות שלה.

על פי סוכנות האנרגיה הבינלאומית (IEA) תגליות נפט עולמיות פחתו לשפל בשנת 2016 כאשר חברות המשיכו לקצץ בהוצאות, ומתן הרשאות לפרויקטים של נפט קונבנציונלי הגיע לרמה הנמוכה ביותר מזה 70 שנה. סוכנות האנרגיה הבינלאומית הזהירה כי שתי המגמות הללו עשויות להימשך בשנת 2017. תגליות הנפט פחתו ל-2.4 מיליארד חביות בשנת 2016, בהשוואה לממוצע של 9 מיליארד חביות לשנה ב-15 השנים האחרונות. בינתיים, היקף המשאבים הקונבנציונליים שהותר לפיתוח צנח לכדי 4.7 מיליארד חביות, 30% פחות מאלו של השנה שעברה, ומספר הפרויקטים שהוחלט סופית להשקיע בהם הגיע לרמה הנמוכה ביותר מאז שנות הארבעים.

הירידה החדה בפעילות בענף נפט הקונבנציונלי היא תוצאה של ירידה בהוצאות להשקעה, שנבעה ממחירי נפט נמוכים. הצניחה בענף הנפט הקונבנציונלי עומדת בניגוד לעוצמתה של תעשיית פצלי הנפט של ארה"ב, שההשקעה בה התאוששה בחדות והתפוקה עלתה כתוצאה מירידה של כ-50% בעלויות הייצור מאז 2014. הגידול בתפוקה של פצלי נפט בארה"ב הפך לגורם מרכזי באיזון הפעילות הנמוכה בתעשיית הנפט הקונבנציונלית.

תפוקת נפט קונבנציונלי של 69 מיליון חביות ליום מהווה החלק הגדול ביותר בתפוקת הנפט העולמית העומדת על 85 מיליון חביות ליום. נוסף על כך 6.5 מיליון חביות ליום מגיעים מהפקת נוזלים מפצלים בארה"ב, והשאר מורכב מנוזלי גז טבעי וממקורות נפט לא קונבנציונליים כמו חולות נפט ונפט כבד.

תעשיית פצלי הנפט של ארה"ב הפחיתה את העלויות שלה במידה כזו שבמקרים רבים היא תחרותית יותר מפרויקטים בנפט קונבנציונלי. המחיר משתווה אפילו לממוצע מחירי הנפט באגן פרמיאן שבטקסס שעמד על 45-40 דולר לחבית בתחילת 2017. הפקת נוזלים מפצלים בארה"ב צפוי להתרחב ב-2.3 מיליון חביות ליום עד 2022 במחירים הנוכחיים, ולהתרחב אף יותר אם יעלו המחירים.

ניסיונות אופ"ק להוריד את התפוקה ולהעלות את המחירים לא השיגו את יעדם, ובאמצע מאי 2017 הסכימו ערב הסעודית ורוסיה להפחית את רמות התפוקה שלהן לתשעה חודשים נוספים, עד מרץ 2018.

קרן המטבע הבינלאומית (IMF) הצהירה ב-2016, כי ההתאוששות המתונה במחירי הנפט צפויה להמשיך. שווקים עתידיים מצביעים על מחיר ממוצע של 47 דולר לחבית ב-2017, ועל כ-56 דולר לחבית ב-2021. אי הוודאות ניכרת בתחזית מחירי הנפט. מתחים גיאופוליטיים עשויים לגרום להפרעות בשוק הנפט, בעוד שרמות גבוהות של רזרבות ותגובה מהירה מצד יצרני פצלי הנפט בארה"ב, אמורים להגביל את טווח עליית המחירים. הביקוש לנפט עשוי להיחלש אם הצמיחה העולמית לא תעמוד בציפיות. בטווח הבינוני, שוק הנפט עלול להצטמק בשל אילוצי היצע, מאחר שהירידה במחירי הנפט הביאה לירידה חדה בהשקעות בשאיבה. 

מחירי נפט נמוכים לזמן ממושך הביאו להאטה בצמיחה, להחלשת המאזן הכספי והמאזן החיצוני, ולהידוק התנאים המוניטריים והפיננסיים במפרץ. הירידה החדה במחירי הנפט ובהכנסות מ-2012, לוותה בירידה ניכרת של החוב הממשלתי ובמידה פחותה יותר בפיחות בשער החליפין הריאלי האפקטיבי, מיתנה את הצמיחה שלא מנפט והגדילה את סיכוני האשראי. האמון העסקי באיחוד האמירויות הערביות ובערב הסעודית הידרדר משנת 2015, חרף התאוששות קלה ב-2016. צמיחה שאינה מנפט פחתה מ-3.8% ב-2015 ל-1.8% ב-2016, וצפויה התאוששות בצמיחה של 3.1% ב-2017. ההתאוששות המתוכננת אינה צפויה להיות אחידה בכל המדינות, והיא תלויה ביישום רפורמות מבניות.

הכנסות נמוכות מפחמימן משמעותן שמודל ההתפתחות הנוכחי המבוסס על חלוקה מחדש של הון הנפט באמצעות משרות ממשלתיות וסובסידיות נדיבות אינו יכול להימשך. האתגר אם כן, הוא לפתח מודל חדש של צמיחה כלכלית שהוא גם עמיד וגם מקיף. במיוחד יש צורך לצמצם את התלות בנפט וליצור משרות במגזר הפרטי עבור כוח העבודה הגדל במהירות. מאחר שהתעסוקה במגזר הציבורי עשויה להיות הרבה יותר מוגבלת בעתיד, תידרשנה משרות חדשות במגזר הפרטי כדי לענות לצורכי 6.5 מיליון עובדים חדשים הצפויים להצטרף לכוח העבודה עד 2022 במדינות ה-GCC, איראן ואלג'יריה. מטרתן של תוכניות הרפורמה של "חזון 2030"כביכול המוצגות ב-GCC, ובמיוחד בערב הסעודית, היא להפחית את התלות בנפט ובגז ולגוון את הכלכלה. זה דורש השקעות גדולות, וזו אחת הסיבות שמדינות המפרץ זקוקות למירב הכנסות ממכירות הנפט. בינתיים, השעון הדמוגרפי מתקתק, עם גידול של כ-2% לשנה באוכלוסייה, או בתוספת של מיליון נפש שיש להאכיל, לחנך, ולבסוף להעסיק. הלחצים בעיראק ובאיראן גדולים אף יותר מאחר שכלכלותיהן מתאוששות משנים של נזקי מלחמה, סנקציות, הזנחה וניהול כושל. 

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Drawing uploaded to Twitter, with the caption: “How Hamas treats Iran by recognizing Israel."

The revised charter published by Hamas at the beginning of May provoked lively debate on Iran’s social networking sites (SNS). As Hamas’ stances appear to be softening, Iranian discourse expressed widespread criticism of the regime’s continued hostility towards Israel and support for the Palestinians. From the perspective of many Iranian users, Hamas’ statement means that Iran is unjustified in adopting a more radical approach to Israel than that taken by the Palestinians, and that instead, the Iranian regime should prioritize the plight of its own citizens. The public discourse in Iran exposes alienation and disappointment vis-à-vis the Palestinians, as well as anger over the price that Iran pays for its continued support.

At a press conference held in Doha, Qatar on May 1, Hamas political bureau chairman Khaled Mashal unveiled the organization’s new statement of principles and policies. In terms of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this revised charter presents a moderated version of the original Hamas charter of 1988. It avoids the blatant anti-Semitism of the previous charter, refrains from calling for the destruction of Israel, and agrees to the establishment of a Palestinian state within 1967 borders, although it does not relinquish all of Palestine or the right of resistance. While the official media in Iran conveyed little interest, SNS thoroughly discussed Hamas’ changed position - particularly in light of the Iranian regime’s hostility toward Israel and denial of Israel’s right to exist, which has remained uncompromisingly consistent since the Islamic revolution.

Iranian criticism of the Palestinians has historical roots dating back to the 1980s, when Palestinians supported Iraq in its war against Iran. Public criticism of Hamas has increased in recent years, due to its alignment with the Syrian rebels, contrary to Iran’s position. As Tehran has increased support for President Assad’s regime, Hamas has turned its back on the Axis of Resistance, an alliance headed by Iran, and including Syria and Hezbollah. Despite Hamas’ longstanding involvement in the Axis of Resistance, it declared its support for the Syrian opposition. Furthermore, Iran perceived Hamas’ support for the Saudi offensive in Yemen as another slap in the face, and evidence of Hamas’ preference for Saudi Arabia and the Sunnis over Tehran. One SNS user described this tension, tweeting that Hamas is ideologically distant from Iran, is unprepared to pay any political price for Iran, and does not condemn the killing of Shi’ites in Iraq.[1]

The negative feelings toward Hamas were clearly reflected in users’ reactions to the charter. Users questioned the justification of Iranian aid to Hamas, given Hamas’ willingness to reformulate a policy toward Israel that contravenes the Iranian position. Most of the criticism was directed at the Iranian government, which continues to assist the Palestinians, including Hamas (mainly its military wing), rather than redressing the situation of Iranian citizens. Several users tweeted: “Not Gaza, not Lebanon, I will sacrifice my life for Iran.” The reformist opposition adopted this slogan during the 2009 riots, as a demand for authorities to focus on solving the problems facing Iranian citizens, rather than participating in Muslim struggles around the world.[2]Users also criticized the regime’s uncompromising ideological stance towards Israel, obtrusive against the backdrop of Hamas’ modified position. One user cynically noted that in light of the Hamas document of principles, the Israeli and Iranian governments have become the only two entities that do not recognize the 1967 borders.[3] Some users even mockingly suggested that calls of “death to Hamas” be included alongside the traditional condemnations of Israel and the United States at the annual International Jerusalem (el-Quds) Day procession held in Iran on the last Friday of Ramadan.[4]

Reformists and critics of the regime skillfully leveraged the situation, exploiting the new statement of principles to bolster the position that Iran should reconsider its financial and military assistance to the Palestinians, and particularly to Hamas. In a tweet, exiled Iranian journalist Ahmad Batebi wondered how many schools, hospitals, and parks could have been built in Iran if not for years of Hamas funding.[5] Likely, recent reports that Iran is increasing its support for Hamas’ military wing, following Yahya Sinwar’s election as Hamas’ new leader in Gaza, contributed to the criticism.

Right-wing conservative supporters of the regime mostly refrained from referring to the change in Hamas’ position, although some sought to downplay its importance. For example, journalist Muhammad Kadri, of the conservative news agency Mehr, tweeted criticism of media outlets affiliated with the reformist camp, which insisted on presenting the Hamas charter as an expression of compromise, despite lack of recognition for 1967 borders.[6] Iranian hardliners ’ disregard for the Hamas charter reflects embarrassment at the change in Hamas’ position, which could weaken Iran’s justification for its uncompromising policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This is not the first time Iranian SNS have become a central arena for debate over Iran's policy toward the Palestinians. One such debate erupted in the summer of 2014, on the eve of an International Jerusalem Day marked by Israel’s Operation Protective Edge in the Gaza Strip. That year, the day meant to express Iran and the Muslim world’s support for the Palestinians and their struggle for the “liberation of Jerusalem” triggered reservations. Many users felt that Iran should not help the Palestinians while its own citizens’ situation remained politically and economically untenable. Furthermore, many expressed hostility towards Hamas, the Palestinians, and the Arabs in general. [7]

Iranian users’ reactions to Hamas’ revised charter are a further expression of the Iranian public’s complex attitude towards the Palestinians. Iranians ideologically support the Palestinians’ right to self-determination and their struggle for independence. However, the willingness of Palestinians, including Hamas, to negotiate with Israel and soften their position, causes some Iranians to question their government’s rigidity, as it claims to be “more Palestinian than the Palestinians.” Increasingly, Iranians express doubts about the expenses paid by the needy at home in trade for their country’s unconditional support for the Palestinians.

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Facebook profile picture of a Saudi user identifying with the prisoner’s struggle by using the caption “Expressing solidarity.”

Beginning on Palestinian Prisoners’ Day, on April 17, Marwan Barghouti led nearly 1,200 Palestinian security prisoners in a hunger strike to protest the conditions of their detention in Israeli jails. The Honor Strike (Akhtarab al-Karamah), which ended on May 27, was accompanied by a public relations campaign on social networking sites (SNS). The campaign enjoyed unprecedented support among users in Arab countries and the Palestinian diaspora. In addition to expressing solidarity with the strikers, many Palestinian SNS users, including supporters of Fatah, expressed deep distaste for Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas. Users described Abbas as an opportunist seeking to suppress any threat to his standing, including the prisoners’ strike. In contrast, many considered Barghouti, currently serving five consecutive life sentences and 40 additional years, a worthy leader capable of rehabilitating Fatah’s image.

Over the course of the campaign, which received 4.5 million views, human rights organizations, BDS,[1] Arab media outlets,[2]and Arab users around the world[3] expressed solidarity with the prisoners’ struggle. Palestinian users described the hunger strike as a heroic act that restored respect for the Palestinians and reengaged global awareness of the Palestinian problem. [4] Barghouti was described as symbolizing the “new Palestine,” inspiring the Palestinian public with the spirit of struggle. Arab users, including Palestinians, encouraged efforts to leverage the struggle by moving from online protest to popular revolt, confronting Israeli security forces and blocking the roads used by settlers. [5]

A related SNS campaign, the “Water and Salt Challenge,” which received an unprecedented nearly 9 million views, called on users to symbolize the hunger strikers’ nutrient consumption by drinking a glass of salt water and posting a picture or video.[6] Participants in this challenge included popular Arab artists, such as Gaza singer Mohammad Assaf, [7] the presenter of Arabs Got Talent, a reality show broadcast in the Gulf states and other Arab countries, and members of Barghouti’s family, such as his son Aarab and his great-granddaughter.

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YouTube video showing users from Gaza drinking a glass of salt water, as a sign of the support for the prisoners' struggle .

Another prominent SNS campaign called for a boycott of Pizza Hut, in response to the Israeli branch’s Twitter commercial ridiculing Barghouti after he was documented eating a Tortit sweet wafer. The commercial asked: “Barghouti, if you’re breaking the strike, wouldn’t pizza be better?” This SNS campaign was viewed tens of thousands of times, and shared several hundred thousand times. The video was later removed, and Pizza Hut severed its relationship with the advertising company.[8] Many users, including Barghouti’s son, commented on the contribution SNS had made to keeping the prisoners’ struggle on the public agenda, and the need to reinforce such online activity. [9] Many users claimed that the Tortit issue was an Israeli propaganda conspiracy designed to sabotage the strike. [10]

The discourse on SNS also reflected a deep distaste for PA Chairman Abbas, expressed by both Hamas and Fatah supporters, due to his perceived indifference to his people’s fate. For example, one Palestinian user wondered why the Palestinian Authority chairman had not presented the issue of the prisoners during his visit with US President Donald Trump. Meanwhile, West Bank users demanded that Abbas stand with the prisoners and not bury his head in the sand. Other users contended that Abbas is unworthy of leading the Palestinian people. For example, one Palestinian user from Jordan stated: “Trump must understand that Mahmoud Abbas lost his legitimacy in 2009, and that he controls no one other than the Fatah gang.”[11] Hamas supporters further fanned the flames, claiming that in addition to ignoring the prisoners, the PA chairman had also imposed sanctions on the Gaza Strip. One Hamas supporter wrote: “Our prisoners are struggling in prison with their empty stomachs, and Gaza is fighting against Mahmoud Abbas’ closure with patience and determination.”[12] Another user remarked: “Israel has never cut off electricity in Gaza and has proven its humanity to the world, as opposed to the barbarism of Mahmoud Abbas!” [13] This user referenced the PA chairman’s threat to stop the financing the cost of electricity transmission from Israel to Gaza in April.

In contrast to Abbas’ criticism, Barghouti achieved striking popularity among Fatah supporters. They consider him the only one able to restore unity to the national movement. One user from east Jerusalem posted: “Fatah has deviated from its path... it is no longer considered at the forefront of the struggle...” and added that Barghouti is working to get Fatah back on track.[14] Another user claimed that Abbas was benefiting from Barghouti’s imprisonment because it kept the latter from realizing his political power.[15]Other Fatah supporters, including those from the Gaza Strip, wrote, “Marwan Barghouti represents me.”[16]These and other statements prove that Barghouti continues to enjoy the broad popular support evident in the Fatah Central Committee elections of December 2016, in which Barghouti garnered a majority vote (930 out of 1300 votes).

After 41 days, the Palestinian prisoners’ strike ended with Israeli Prison Service’s agreement to double the number of visits prisoners can receive each month, from a single visit to two visits, and to discuss the remaining demands. Users described the strike’s results as a glorious victory, which despite Israel’s attempts, had strengthened the morale of the Palestinian people, and proven the necessity of demonstrating devotion to the struggle against Israel.[17] SNS were a key platform for maintaining international awareness of the Palestinian prisoners’ situation. The dizzying success of the online campaigns confirmed the organizers’ confidence in the importance of exploiting SNS in the struggle against Israel. These campaigns strengthened Barghouti’s political power, against a backdrop of the Palestinian Authority’s leadership succession struggles, in light of Abbas’ imminent departure.

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Turkish President Erdoğan with his mother in a picture that was part of the “Praise to mothers who gave birth to heros” campaign. 

As discourse on Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s referendum victory and subsequent accusations of fraud has subsided, Turkish social networking sites’ (SNS) focus has returned to tension between the secular and Islamic publics. This tension was reflected in SNS users’ responses to Deep History,‎‎ a Turkish television program about the love life of the republic’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. From many Turks’ perspective, the program crossed a red line with its unprecedented portrayal of Atatürk’‎‎s personal life. Meanwhile, International Mother’‎‎s Day provided Erdoğan’s conservative supporters with another opportunity to challenge Atatürk‎’‎‎s legacy, attempting to replace Atatürk‎’‎‎s mother with Erdoğan‎’‎‎s mother as Turkey’‎‎s national mother.‎‎ The war of mothers‎‎ represents a further attempt to convert ‎Old Turkey‎‎ into Erdoğan‎’‎‎s New Turkey,‎‎ shifting the monopolies and shapes of major symbols of the past. This exemplifies the profound changes all areas of Turkish life have undergone during the past 15 years.

Producers of Deep History, which was broadcast on May 8 on TVNET, a Turkish television channel identified with the Erdoğan‎ administration, said that the program was intended to shed light on Atatürk’s undisclosed history. Deep History featured public figures oppositional to Atatürk, who made claims about his “‎‎gallery of lovers.”‎‎ For example, historian Süleyman Yeşilyurt claimed that Atatürk‎ had forbidden relations with his adopted daughter, the well-known historian Afet İnan, whom Yeşilyurt called “‎‎the undeclared wife of the president.”‎‎ To support this claim, the program’s participants used, inter alia, the proximity of their respective bedrooms as evidence. The program became the focus of considerable attention on SNS. Many secular users claimed that Deep History was defamatory, dishonoring the founder of the republic. In response, users added Atatürk’‎‎s picture to their Facebook profile pictures - a common sign of identification on SNS. Users called for a boycott of the magazine distributed by the program. Using the hashtag “‎Lawyers for the task‎,”[1]‎ users also called on pro-Atatürk attorneys to take legal action against the program. The Atatürk‎ Memory Protection Act, passed in 1951, provides for punitive measures in cases of physical or verbal violence against Atatürk‎’‎‎s legacy. The law, opposed by Turkish Islamists, received international attention in 2007, after the Turkish judiciary blocked national access to YouTube because a video posted on the site desecrated Atatürk’s legacy by portraying the republic’s founder as a dog. In order for the court order to be cancelled, reopening Turkish access to the popular site, Turkish companies were forced to acquire the rights to the video and remove it. Indeed, the secular public’s uproar in response to Deep History led to Yeşilyurt’s arrest.[2]

SNS discourse about slights to Atatürk‎’‎s legacy was reignited on International Mother’‎s Day, on May 14. Reflecting an integral element of the ‎Kemalist‎ secular heritage, many secular users posted pictures of Atatürk’s mother, Zübeyde Hanım, with captions like “‎Mothers can change the world,” and messages congratulating her for successfully raising a son destined to save the homeland from foreign occupiers. For many years, the image of Zübeyde Hanım has been embedded in the Turkish educational system. Zübeyde Hanım is presented as a role model for young mothers, considering her struggle to raise little Mustafa on her own after the death of her husband Ali Rıza. For Turks, Zübeyde Hanım carries deep symbolic significance, with many buildings in Turkey bearing her name. However, while secular users marked Mother’‎s Day with tributes to Atatürk‎’‎s mother, supporters of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) instead praised Erdoğan‎'s mother, Tenzile Erdoğan, using the slogan “‎Praise mothers who gave birth to heroes.”‎ This campaign to unseat Zübeyde Hanım as mother of the nation, in favor of Tenzile Erdoğan, reflected an attempt to reorder Turkish society, coronating President Erdoğan‎ as founder of the ‎New Turkey.

Meanwhile, in addition to secular and Islamist users, other camps joined the war of mothers. Left-wing users praised the mothers of journalist Uğur Mumcu, poet Nâzım Hikmet, and fighter Deniz Gezmiş, each representing a different sector in the leftist bloc. While Mumcu, who was assassinated by Islamists 1993, underscores secular and republican values, Marxist fighter Gezmiş, executed by the Turkish government in 1972, and Communist poet Hikmet, who died in exile in Russia in 1963, symbolize the diversity of the Turkish left. Conversely, right-wing users shared images of mothers who had lost their sons in the struggle against the Kurdish underground (PKK) and the recent Turkish military operation against ISIS in northern Syria. Supporters of the Turkish government mounted a campaign to sanctify the image of Ömer Halisdemir, a soldier who was killed after he shot a Turkish officer participating in the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016, and praised his mother.[3]

Kurdish users also joined the discourse, praising the heroism and sacrifice of Kurdish mothers. Additionally, they recalled the Kurds who have been missing since the skirmishes between the Turkish army and PKK began in the 1990s. Kurdish users expressed hope that Kurdish and Turkish mothers would no longer need to mourn their children, and called for peace between the two sides.[4]

Despite the relative immunity that Atatürk‎ still enjoys in Turkish symbolic and political space, the present discourse includes voices seeking to establish Erdoğan‎ as the new founder of the Turkish state, overriding Atatürk’‎s iconic legacy. The ‎war of mothers‎ that developed on SNS is indicative of the segmentation dividing the public in Erdoğan‎’‎s New Turkey.‎ For each camp, a different mother of the nation represents the ideal sociopolitical model for Turkish society.

Senior Researcher and Head of the Economic Desk at the Moshe Dayan Center, Dr. Paul Rivlin, participated in a forum hosted by the UCLA Nazarian Center, entitled "Six Days/Five Decades: 1967 and its Significance for Israeli Security, Politics, and Society.  His remarks can be viewed here, beginning at 1:09:07.  In English.

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President 'Abd al-'Aziz Bouteflika/

Source: http://www.ansamed.info

The May 4, 2017 parliamentary elections in Algeria reaffirmed the regime’s stability and its control over the institutions of the state. These elections and the formation of a new government should be viewed as a preparatory phase for the next presidential election, to be held in 2019 or earlier, if the ailing President Bouteflika is unable to complete his fourth term.

In the elections to the House of Representatives (the National Popular Assembly), the two major parties – the National Liberation Front (FLN) and the National Rally for Democracy (RND), which constitute the regime’s political power base – together attained a clear majority. Out of 462 seats they collectively won 261 (161 and 100); and two more nationalist parties are expected to join them – TAJ (Rally of Algerian Hope) – 19 seats - and the MPA (Algerian Popular Movement) – 13 seats. Meanwhile the legal Islamist opposition performed poorly again, having split once more (due to personal rivalries) after its disappointing performance in the previous elections in 2012; its core – the MSP (Movement of Society for Peace) – won just 33 seats (compared to 48 seats in 2012). Another Islamist list won 15 seats. Notwithstanding Parliament’s limited powers (the real power is concentrated in the hands of senior generals and politicians around the President – the “pouvoir”), around 12,000 candidates competed in the elections. The seats were divided between 35 (mostly small) parties and independents. However, the low voter turnout (35% as opposed to 45% in 2012) demonstrates the apathy prevalent among large segments of the population.[1]

Six years after the Arab uprisings – particularly in neighboring Tunisia – the Algerian political system has been characterized by continued stability and continuity. The policyadopted by the authorities during the unrest – a certain degree of openness in the political arena, such as improving the electoral process, allowing new parties and greater freedom of the press, and economic liberalization – in combination with a determined police crackdown on public disorder and the continued and unrelenting struggle against the hard-core Islamist insurgents from the 1992-1999 civil war (now rebranded as al-Qaʿida in the Maghreb - AQIM) both in the Kabyle mountains and southern desert, has been successful. The regime also restored security in the south, which had been undermined by the Islamist rebels’ high profile raid on the oil production facilities in In Amenas in January 2013. This required major military redeployments and was achieved in cooperation with Tunisia, anti-Islamists in Libya, French forces in Mali and Niger and (less publicly) the U.S.

However, it should be emphasized that neither of the country’s two main problems have been solved: the ongoing socio-economic crisis, arising from high unemployment, a shortage of housing, poverty, a large youthful population, and the inability (or lack of will) to build an economy that is less dependent on oil and gas. This crisis has deepened in the last two years following the sharp decline in oil prices. Oil profits, which are the main source of income for the government, have enabled the regime to alleviate local socio-economic problems emerging from time to time by distributing “rent” earned from oil and gas revenues.

For instance, following the 2013 raid on In Amenas, the southern districts, which had been neglected by the government, were given larger budgets for employment and general development. However, the decline in oil prices has limited the government’s freedom to solve major problems by distributing hydrocarbon wealth and increasingly forced it to dip into its foreign currency reserves, which have eroded from $194 billion in 2014 to $114 billion in 2016.

Following the elections, the president appointed a new government and placed at its head one of his veteran loyalists, the 72-year-old Abdelmajid Tebboune, who had previously served as minister for housing. The new government included 15 new ministers; its focus will be on economic recovery (austerity and creating new economic sectors, apart from oil and gas) and dealing with the central social challenges: unemployment, housing, health, and education.[2]

The main implications of these elections are: First, a demonstration of the regime’s stability. It even brought the wheel-chair-bound (following a 2013 stroke) President Bouteflika – who was often described by the opposition as incapacitated – to a rare “photo opportunity” at the voting polls, but his inability to insert the voting slip into the ballot box under his own power spoke for itself.

Second, it can be presumed that the regime saw the elections as a preparatory step toward the 2019 presidential elections, if Bouteflika survives until then. Candidates for the election are likely to be drawn from President Bouteflika’s ruling faction. Military leaders and a small group of politicians from the president’s entourage – headed by his brother Saʿid – are making every effort to place the president’s supporters (generally coming from the west of the country) in key positions. This is the case with the new Prime Minister Tebboune and with Abdelmoumen Ould Kaddour, a native of Tlemcen in the west, who, in a surprise move, was appointed as the CEO of the national oil company Sonatrach two months ago, replacing a Kabylian from the east.[3]

Third, it is obvious to the regime that to sustain its rule it has to deliver economic growth and diversification and reduce spending, in order to overcome the budget shortfalls caused by the drop in oil price. Hydrocarbon revenues declined from 3.39 billion in 2014 to 1.78 billion in 2016 (in Algerian dinars). This may require austerity measures, which has the potential not only to generate popular unrest, but also to limit imports, which would hurt some major businessmen close to the president’s regime.

Finally, it is clear that other factions are also preparing for the succession struggle, which will likely mark a generational shift. Among those potentially vying for the position is a younger generation of generals. Indeed, the May 2017 parliamentary election should not obscure the fact that the military still remains the strongest force in Algerian politics.

Gideon Gera is a Principal Researcher Emeritus at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies (MDC), Tel Aviv University.

"[...] the seemingly contradictory individualistic and collectivistic sides of Palestinian youth are in fact reconcilable, and that social media plays a key role in framing the two together. They reject the social and political templates imposed by the traditional collectives, and expect the freedom to choose and even create the collective that suits their personal views and interests.

Social media provides such alternatives by creating social arenas in the form of online communities of various sizes and interests, ranging from small local groups to national-level ones. These online communities augment and sometimes even replace the old collectives as sources of authority and as an arena for collective action in the pursuit of a diverse range of goals."

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Advertisement for now-banned application in the Apple Store, 2011

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ב-21 במרס 2017 מושל מחוז כרכוכ, נג'מדין כרים, הניף את דגל כורדיסטאן מעל מצודת העיר כרכוכ המכונה בפיהם ירושלים של הכורדים. התאריך שנבחר להנפת הדגל היה החג הלאומי נוורוז והוא נועד לסמל את השתייכותו של מחוז כרכוכ  לישות הכורדית המתגבשת בכורדיסטאן העיראקית. הנפת הדגל היוותה קריאת תגר וקביעת עובדות בשטח על חבל ארץ הנתון במחלוקת מאז הקמתה של עיראק המודרנית בשנת 1920.[1]אכן, התגובות הנזעמות לא איחרו לבוא מבגדאד, מטהרן ומאנקרה, אך הכורדים המשיכו בשלהם.

חשיבותו של מחוז כרכוכ נובעת ממרבצי הנפט העצומים שבו וההטרוגניות  האתנית דתית של תושביו. הנפט אכן היה הגורם המרכזי שהניע את האימפריה הבריטית לכבוש את הפרובינציה (וילאית) של מוצול  (שכרכוכ הייתה חלק ממנה) מידי הטורקים בנובמבר 1914, ואת מדיניות השערוב שנקטו ממשלות בגדאד השונות במחוז כרכוכ. מחקר חדש מראה כי מדיניות השערוב החלה כבר בשנת 1929, כאשר שיעור הערבים במחוז זה עמד על 20%  בלבד מכלל התושבים.[2]תהליך השערוב התעצם ביתר שאת תחת המשטר הרפובליקאי ובעיקר בתקופת שלטון הבעת' (2003-1968).[3]שאלת כרכוכ  נותרה סלע המחלוקת העיקרי בין ממשלת בגדאד לבין הכורדים בראשות מולא מצטפא ברזאני גם אחרי החתימה על הסכם מרס 1970 שהעניק אוטונומיה לכורדים.

שאלת כרכוכ ואזורי המחלוקת שבו ועלו לדיון אחרי נפילת משטר הבעת'ב-2003. החוקה החדשה של שנת 2005 כללה התייחסות מוגדרת לשאלה זו בסעיף 140, שכלל את הנקודות הבאות: א. התושבים שגורשו מכרכוכ ומאזורים אחרים בעקבות מדיניות השערוב של הממשלות הקודמות ישובו למקומותיהם ויקבלו פיצויים, ואילו מתיישבים חדשים שהובאו על ידי השלטונות ישובו לדרום. ב. ייערך מפקד אוכלוסין באזורים הנתונים למחלוקת. ג. ייערך משאל עם שיבדוק האם התושבים שבאזורי המחלוקת מבקשים להיות חלק מעיראק או מהאזור האוטונומי בכורדיסטאן.[4]סעיף 140 היה אמור להיכנס לתוקפו בשנת 2007 אך עד היום ממשלות עיראק נמנעו מלקיים אותו בתירוצים שונים.

עליית דאעש והשתלטותו על מוצול ביוני 2014, תוך קריסה פתאומית ומוחלטת של צבא עיראק, אפשרה לכורדים להשתלט בתוך זמן קצר על כרכוכ ועל יתר אזורי המחלוקת. כיום, מנסים הכורדים למנף את העובדות שקבעו בשטח כדי להגיע לעצמאות דה יורה, שכן, בראייתם הם השיגו את הגבולות הטריטוריאליים של מדינת כורדיסטאן המדומיינת שלהם. הנפת דגל כורדיסטאן בכרכוכ הייתה אפוא ביטוי סמלי למהלכים האסטרטגיים שפיתחה ההנהגה הכורדית בדרך לעצמאות זוחלת.

מהי האסטרטגיה הכורדית ומה האתגרים הניצבים בפניה? נראה שההחלטה לאמץ את רעיון העצמאות כמטרה אסטרטגית נפלה סופית בשנת 2014, אחרי שהכורדים השיגו שליטה על האזורים העתירים בנפט ועקב חולשתה הגדולה של ממשלת בגדאד והסכסוכים המתמשכים אתה בנושאים כלכליים, פוליטיים וצבאיים. מי שמוביל את המהלך לעצמאות כיום היא המפלגה הדמוקרטית הכורדיסטאנית והעומדים בראשה: הנשיא מסעוד ברזאני, אחיינו ראש הממשלה, נצ'ירואן ברזאני, ובנו של הנשיא מסרור ברזאני, האחראי על מנגנוני הביטחון. האתגר הראשון שעמד בפניהם היה להביא לפיוס פנימי עם שתי המפלגות היריבות: מפלגת האיחוד הפטריוטי של כורדיסטאן, שמנהיגה ההיסטורי והכריזמאטי היה ג'לאל טלבאני, ומפלגת גוראן שבראשה עמד נאושירוואן מצטפא. סלע המחלוקת העיקרי בין שלוש המפלגות היה חלוקת הכוח והמשאבים הכלכליים, וסירובו של הנשיא ברזאני לפנות את כיסאו אחרי שחלפו שנתיים מתום הקדנציה שלו, שהוארכה בשנתיים באוגוסט 2013. מה שהעיב יותר מכל על היחסים היה פיזור הפרלמנט באוקטובר 2015 עקב סכסוך בין גוראן למפלגה הדמוקרטית הכורדיסטאנית. לאור המשבר החמור הזה פתחה זו בסוף 2016 בניסיונות פיוס עם מפלגת האיחוד הפטריוטי של כורדיסטאן,  שהייתה נתונה במצב חולשה מתמשך עקב סכסוכים פנימיים בין אגפיה השונים ויציאתו של טלבאני מהמשחק הפוליטי בשל אירוע מוחי שלקה בו בשנת 2012. אחרי כמה סבבי הידברות הגיעו הצדדים לידי פיוס ואף אימצו קו משותף בחתירה לעצמאות, כשהמטרה הראשונה היא לקיים משאל עם. בזמן כתיבת שורות אלה, ב-13 ביוני 2017, הם החליטו על פתיחה מחודשת של הפרלמנט כדי לאפשר את השתתפותה של מפלגת גוראן במשאל העם.  

משאל העם, שהוא אבן היסוד השנייה באסטרטגיה הכורדית, אמור להיערך ב-25 בספטמבר 2017, ולהציג שאלה אחת לכלל התושבים בחבל הכורדי, ובכללם תושבי האזורים הנתונים במחלוקת, והיא תבדוק אם הם תומכים בעצמאות כורדיסטאן. מטרת המשאל היא להעניק לגיטימציה פנימית ובינלאומית למהלך של עצמאות וגם, ובעיקר, לאפשר את סיפוח כרכוכ ואזורים אחרים לחבל הכורדי, כמימוש לסעיף 140.

ברור שמהלך כזה צפוי להתקבל בהתנגדות נחרצת של ממשלת בגדאד.  ומכאן החלק השלישי באסטרטגיה הכורדית, דהיינו לנסות להגיע להבנות עם ממשלת בגדאד על היפרדות מרצון. ההיגיון מאחורי המהלך הזה הוא שאם אכן תסכים ממשלת בגדאד לפתרון הזה כי אז תזכה המדינה הכורדית ללגיטימציה אזורית ובינלאומית. התקרבות מסוימת בין ההנהגה הכורדית לראש ממשלת עיראק חיידר אל-עבאדי חלה בקיץ-סתיו 2016, כאשר הצדדים הגיעו להבנות בענייני ביטחון וההנהגה הכורדית אפשרה לצבא עיראק לעבור דרך השטחים הכורדיים כדי לנהל את המלחמה נגד דאעש במוצול. עבאדי אף צוטט כמי שאמר שלכורדים יש זכות להגדרה עצמית.[5]סביר מאוד להניח שעמדתו של עבאדי הייתה טקטית וננקטה לפתרון בעיית מוצול הדוחקת. העובדה היא שמאז אותה התבטאות לא חלו התפתחויות משמעותיות בעניין הזה, מה גם שעבאדי נתון ללחצים מצד המחנה השיעי על כל חלקיו נגד מהלך של היפרדות.

היבט אחר של האסטרטגיה הברזאנית היה פיתוח יחסים הדוקים עם טורקיה, מהלך שהחלו בו כבר בשנת 2008. ההישג המשמעותי ביותר במישור הזה היה עורק החיים שטורקיה סיפקה לישות הכורדית המתפתחת ושהביטוי החשוב ביותר שלו היה צינורות הנפט והגז העצמאיים שאנקרה אפשרה להעביר דרך שטחה.[6]בכך אמנם חלה התקדמות כורדית לעבר עצמאות כלכלית אך במחיר כבד של סכסוך חריף עם הממשלה בבגדאד ותלות הולכת וגוברת של החבל הכורדי בטורקיה. מבחינה מדינית טורקיה העדיפה את יחסיה עם ארביל על חשבון אלה עם בגדאד, במיוחד לאור השסע הסוני-שיעי המעמיק. אנקרה נתנה ביטוי  ליחסים עם ארביל עם הנפת דגל כורדיסטאן בשדה התעופה באיסטנבול ובאנקרה בעת קבלת הפנים שערכה למסעוד ברזאני בביקורו בפברואר השנה.[7]הדגל אמנם הונף לצד דגלה של עיראק, אך אין להתעלם מהסמליות של הנפת דגל כורדי במדינה שעד לפני זמן קצר צעד כזה היה נחשב לכפירה בעיקר.

המסע הדיפלומטי לגיוס תמיכה בעצמאות כורדיסטאן העיראקית, שהכורדים עורכים ברחבי העולם בראשותו של הנשיא ברזאני הוא חלק משמעותי אחר באסטרטגיה שלהם. מסע זה נועד למנף את התהפוכות בעיראק ובסוריה והסכנה המרחפת על העולם מהארגונים האסלאמיים הקיצוניים, כדי להציג דימוי חיובי לכורדיסטאן העיראקית. הדימוי הזה נשען על הלחימה הכורדית הנועזת של הפשמרגה נגד דאעש, האוריינטציה הפרו-מערבית של החבל והברית האסטרטגית שלו עם ארה"ב, היציבות של האזור, והפתיחות שהכורדים מגלים כלפי מיעוטים ועקורים שנפגעו במהלך המלחמה. המערך הדיפלומטי שנושא על שכמו את המהלכים הללו מבוסס כיום על 40 נציגויות כורדיות הפועלות ברחבי העולם. במקביל נפתחו בארביל  36 נציגויות זרות המתפקדות כשגרירויות לכל דבר.[8]אין ספק שבקהילייה הבינלאומית יש כיום הבנה ומודעות גדולות יותר מאשר בעבר לנושא הכורדי בעיראק, ולפי עיתון כורדי מדינות רבות ובכללן ארה"ב, בריטניה, צרפת, איטליה, טורקיה, ירדן, כווית ומדינות מפרץ אחרות אף הודיעו לנציגים כורדיים שהן "יגלו הבנה אם הכורדים יכריזו על עצמאות.[9]

הצעדים האסטרטגיים הללו, הננקטים בזהירות ובאופן מחושב, אינם מטשטשים את האתגרים הניצבים בדרך, ושההנהגה הכורדית מודעת להם היטב. בין האתגרים יש להזכיר את הסכנה של מלחמת אזרחים עקב מאבקים פנימיים בקרב הכורדים עצמם או בינם לבין השלטון בבגדאד;  התערבות איראנית במגמה לטרפד את המהלך הזה על ידי הפעלת מיליציות שיעיות כדוגמת אל-חשד אל-שעבי; או התערבות צבאית טורקית על רקע שאלת כרכוכ. יחד עם זאת, ניתן להצביע על מגמה נחרצת ועקבית של ההנהגה ללכת על המהלך הזה שזוכה לתמיכה עממית נרחבת.[10]

ג'לאל טלבאני היה זה שטבע את הביטוי "כרכוכ ירושלים של הכורדים".[11]קובאד טלבאני בנו המכהן כסגן ראש ממשלת החבל הכורדי, חזר על הדימוי בתגובתו על הנפת הדגל בכרכוכ באומרו: "ברכות על הנפת דגלנו בירושלים הכורדיסטאנית,"ואף הזכיר את דברי אביו משנת 1992 שאמר כי כרכוכ היא המפתח לפתרון הבעיה הכורדית.[12]אבל כרכוכ היא לא רק מפתח היא גם חבית ענקית של נפט דליק, שמעורבים בה גורמים ואינטרסים שונים ומגוונים, היא עלולה להפוך לפצצת זמן שתטרפד את המהלך לעצמאות, אם לא תשכיל ההנהגה הכורדית לטפל בה בזהירות, באורך רוח ובחכמה.  

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Source: World Atlas

The blockade imposed on Qatar by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Arab states has once again thrown this tiny emirate into the limelight. The reasons are complex and some are obscure, as is so much that happens in the Middle East. One explanation is that Saudi Arabia and its allies want to end Qatar’s support for Islamists fighting in Syria and for Hamas in Gaza. Another is that they object to Qatar’s close relations with Iran. They are apparently furious over reports that Qatar paid $1 billion ransom for the release of members of the ruling family who had been kidnapped in Iraq. The reports suggest that the funds were paid both to Sunni Islamic terrorists and to Iran. There is the continued anger regarding Al Jazeera, the Qatari television channel that criticizes everyone except the Qatari regime. Most dramatically Foreign Policy reported that a May 23, 2017 news report in which the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamid Al Thani purportedly criticized the Saudis while praising Iran and Israel was fake news, planted by state-backed Russian hackers. CNN then reported that U.S. intelligence officials also believe Russian hackers planted the fake story. Even without these rumors, Qatar’s policies have long been controversial; its support for the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Iran and its relations with Israel are all contradictory and it has managed to get away with it up to now. The UAE is reported to be campaigning for the US base in Qatar to be moved to its territory. What appears to be new is the development of Saudi policy following the visit to Riyadh by President Trump in late May 2017. President Trump has expressed support for Saudi Arabia and since the crisis erupted has announced a large arms deal with Qatar.

Saudi Arabia and Qatar have supported opposite sides in the conflicts that have developed in the Arab world since the Arab Spring began. Most dramatic was Qatar’s support for the Islamist President Morsi in Egypt. In line with its support for the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar offered financial support to Egypt when Morsi was in office. Once he was ousted, Saudi Arabia offered financial support to President Sisi. The dispute between the two countries also reflected their positions in Tunisia, Libya, and Syria. This compounds what Saudi Arabia sees as Qatar’s worst sin: its continued friendly relations with Iran. Saudi Arabia has strong support from the UAE and Bahrain and somewhat weaker support from Kuwait. It is also supported by Egypt and the United States, despite the fact that the latter has a large military base in Qatar.

Qatar borders Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf and has an area of 11,571 square kilometers (4,468 square miles). The border has one crossing point and the vast majority of Qatar’s food is imported through it. As a result of the land, sea, and air blockades imposed by Saudi Arabia and its allies, fears of shortages of food and other goods have developed. Some suppliers from outside the region have also stopped sending goods to Qatar, although Turkey and Iran have maintained their links.

Of the country’s 2.7 million people, only about 235,000 are citizens; the rest are foreign residents and temporary laborers. The 2015 Census revealed that 1.44 million foreign workers lived in labor camps, 93 percent of whom were male. During 2015, the population increased by 2.9 percent. In March 2017, the International Labour Organization (ILO) deferred a decision on whether to investigate Qatar for forced labor violations, giving it until November to implement labor reforms to improve migrant workers’ rights. Many foreign workers are employed in low-paid construction jobs to build stadiums and infrastructure for the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Qatar has come under much criticism in recent years, with activists and trade unions reporting abuses, including squalid living conditions, poor health and safety standards, and migrants having their pay withheld and passports confiscated.

In 2015, Qatar had a national income (GDP) of $165 billion, or about $68,000 per capita. GDP per Qatari was $733,000! Hydrocarbons (oil, gas and refined products) account for just over 60 percent of GDP. The largest export is liquefied natural gas (see below).

In 1971, Qatar gained full independence from the United Kingdom and since then has been a constitutional monarchy ruled by the Al Thani family. The emir, or ruler, 37 year-old Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani has continued his father’s work since taking power following his father’s abdication in 2013. Hamad bin Khalifa (1995-2013) greatly increased Qatar’s global profile and influence after seizing power from his father in a 1995 coup. Qatar’s political influence is closely related to the rapid growth of its economy and its accumulation of huge financial reserves. It has deliberately generated “noise” in the international system so that it would be noticed and accumulate prestige. It is a member of OPEC and the GCC. Its success in winning the right to host the 2022 World Cup has been controversial since it was awarded in 2010. The project, with estimated costs of at least $200 billion, may be threatened by the current political and economic crisis.

The hydrocarbon sector is central to Qatar’s economy, although its share in GDP has declined. Qatar accounts for one third of global LNG trade. Over the past two decades, oil and gas accounted for around 80 percent of exports of goods and services, and revenues from the hydrocarbon sector represented almost 90 percent of total government revenue (See Figure 1).

Figure 1

Qatar: Hydrocarbon production and exports, 1997-2013

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Source: IMF

According to British Petroleum, (Statistical Review of World Energy 2017), at the end of 2016 Qatar had 25.2 billion barrels of oil reserves, 0.3 percent of the world total. Its production in that year averaged 1.9 million barrels a day, 2.1 percent of world output. Oil revenues have fallen sharply in recent years as a result of the reduction in international prices. In 2012, Qatar’s oil exports were worth $65 billion and in 2016 they came to $24 billion.

At the end of 2015, Qatar had 24.3 trillion cubic meters (858.1 million cubic feet) of natural gas reserves, 13 percent of world reserves with a reserve/production ratio of 135 years. (By way of comparison, Israel had 0.2 trillion cubic meters (5.5 trillion cubic feet) of reserves.) Qatari national gas production came to 181.4 million cubic meters, 5.1 percent of world production. It was the fourth largest producer in the world after the US, Russia, and Iran. Table 1 shows that liquefied natural gas (LNG) has been Qatar’s largest export. It also shows both the dominance of hydrocarbons in total exports and the extent of their decline in value between 2012 and 2015. 

Table 1

Qatar’s exports, 2012-2015

($ billions)

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Source: IMF

LNG is natural gas (predominantly methane, and some ethane) that has been converted to liquid form for ease of storage or transport. It takes up about 1/600th the volume of natural gas in the gaseous state. It is odorless, colorless, non-toxic, and non-corrosive. The liquefaction process requires large investments and it is therefore necessary to sign long-term contracts to make the investment feasible. This makes it a very different product from oil.

The majority of Qatar's natural gas is located in the massive offshore North Field, which spans an area similar to that of Qatar. Part of the world's largest non-associated, natural-gas field, the North Field, is a geological extension of Iran's South Pars / North Dome Gas-Condensate field, which holds an additional 450 trillion cubic feet (13 trillion cubic meters) of recoverable natural-gas reserves. Qatargas, established in 1984 as a state-owned company, pioneered the development of LNG in Qatar. Qatargas is the largest LNG producing company in the world, with an annual LNG production capacity of 38 million tons a year.

As a result of its strong balance of payments, Qatar has accumulated large foreign currency reserves. In 2005, it created a sovereign investment fund and has invested large sums abroad, recently estimated at $335 billion. These investments - the most prominent of which is an $11 billion stake in Volkswagen - have provided it with an income, thus diversifying its revenues away from hydrocarbons. Its international exposure helps to explain the reluctance of European countries to take sides in the dispute.

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the fall in hydrocarbon revenues has hit the government budget and the balance of payments. The 2016 fiscal deficit was financed mainly through domestic and foreign borrowing, although the sovereign wealth fund was not drawn down. In 2016, Qatar raised $ 14.5 billion of external debt and issued US$ 2.6 billion of domestic bonds and Sukuk (Islamic bonds). Public debt estimated at about 48 percent of GDP at end 2016, was manageable, given the size of Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund.

The current account balance sharply deteriorated and the current account balance, fell from a surplus of 8.4 percent of GDP in 2015 to a deficit estimated at 2.2 percent in 2016. Imports were stable in dollar terms (at about US$ 30 billion), given high public investment expenditure and non-hydrocarbon growth. Reserves-in-months of imports remained adequate. The deterioration of the current account balance has also been accompanied by reduced financial outflows, particularly public sector’s accumulation of foreign assets.

The Qatari economy has sufficient financial reserves to keep it afloat, but shortages of food and other vital goods may disrupt life and even generate social instability. Qatar is not a military threat to Saudi Arabia and it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia will invade given its entanglement in Yemen and the fact that the US uses Qatar’s Al Udeid military base as the forward headquarters for the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). The US policy towards Qatar is ambiguous: it has accused Doha of supporting terrorism while at the same time announcing a $12 billion arms agreement that includes the sale of up to 36 F-15 fighter jets.

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The battle to dominate the district of Sinjar, 100 kilometers west of Mosul, has been approaching like a sandstorm on the horizon. This is because Sinjar, the scene of Yezidi genocide[1] since 2014, is undergoing a multi-faceted struggle for power between the various factions fighting the Islamic State (IS). These groups include the Iraqi Kurds, the Iraqi government, Iranian-backed elements of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the Syrian-Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), and numerous Yezidi factions aligned with the different players.

Background on Sinjar

Situated on the Iraqi-Syrian border, Sinjar is the last Iraqi city on Highway 47, the trade road between Mosul and Syria. The Yezidis and Kurds of the district were brutalized by the Baʿthist government in the 1970s and 1980s, with rural populations displaced into dismal collective villages called mujamma.[2] After Saddam’s fall, the majority of Yezidis continued to live in the mujamma, which by that point had grown into towns and fallen under the political dominance and security aegis of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the dominant Kurdish force in the northern part of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The rural areas of Sinjar were policed by the (mainly Yezidi) 3rd Iraqi Army division. 

The Iraqi Army disintegrated when the Islamic State attacked in June 2014, and then two months later, the KDP Peshmerga also fled as the Islamic State’s war spread into the Kurdistan Region.[3] The Yezidis formed the Sinjar Resistance Units (YBŞ), which received support from the PKK armed wing and the neighbouring Syrian Kurdish YPG, an affiliate of the PKK.[4] These forces sustained a safe haven for Yezidi civilians on Sinjar Mountain, a forty-kilometer-long anticline towering nearly 700 meters above the surrounding plains. Another Yezidi militia called the Protection Force of Êzidkhan (HPE) operated at a slight remove from the PKK and eventually fell under the control of the KDP Peshmerga.[5]

Though the KDP Peshmerga and their Yezidi allies played a major role in relieving the Islamic State siege of Sinjar Mountain in November 2014, tensions have remained high between the Kurds and most of the other militias in the area. From my experience visiting the area before the Islamic State takeover, I can attest that the Yezidis of Sinjar were never overly fond of KDP domination of their local politics, but nonetheless desperately needed Kurdish protection, being lodged between the terrorist hubs of Tel Afar, Baʿaj, and the Syrian border. Since the failure of the KDP Peshmerga in 2014, Yezidi forces, such as the YBŞ, are now seeking greater autonomy in local governance and have set up their own Self-Administration Council with PKK and YPG support.[6] Yezidi forces in the YBŞ lacked the military power to liberate the Yezidi villages south of Sinjar, and pro-KDP Yezidi forces have frustratingly remained under KDP command, less than 30 kilometers from the homes, for the last two years.[7] For the Kurdistan Region, although the domination of Yezidi towns became a political habit, these towns were not considered worth sustaining high casualties to liberate.

Enter the Outside Players

Turkey and Iran-backed PMF militias crashed into this complex picture during the first half of this year. Ankara’s interest in the issue has been twofold. First, the PKK and YPG roles in Sinjar were alarming to Turkey because the area appears to provide the anti-Turkey groups with a land bridge between their bases in Iraqi Kurdistan and Syrian Kurdistan, known as Rojava.  Turkey and the KDP had collaborated on closing the KDP-Rojava border,[8] and Sinjar seemed to give the PKK and YPG a way to flank this obstacle. For both the Turks and the KDP, expansion of PKK military power inside the Kurdistan Region is considered deeply unsettling. An escalation of pressure against the PKK in Sinjar may have been appealing this summer, considering President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan needed military distractions to placate the Turkish General Staff.[9]

However, unfortunately for Turkey, the PKK, YPG, and Yezidi YBŞ enclave in Sinjar is not an easy target. Contrary to depictions of Sinjar as “another Qandil,”[10] Sinjar is not a formidable redoubt with imposing physical defenses, such as those of the PKK’s base camps. Instead, the difficulties of attacking Sinjar are primarily political. The KDP-PKK battles of the 1990s[11] left today’s Kurdish leadership with the indelible impression of a fanatical and skilled adversary. Additionally, spilling PKK blood, Kurdish blood, would be politically unpopular in the Kurdistan Region. For these reasons, the KDP’s preference was first to use KDP-trained Syrian Kurds, the so-called Rojava Peshmerga,[12] to isolate Sinjar Mountain and the surrounding areas from the Syrian border, and thus from the assistance offered by the YPG. This effort failed when the YPG backed up Yezidi YBŞ and PKK forces on Sinjar Mountain’s northern foothills. Using two hundred troops, eight tanks, and two-dozen anti-aircraft cannons,[13] the YPG blunted the Rojava Peshmerga in a series of skirmishes[14] in early March 2017. The Syrian Kurds were clearly sensitive to the risk that Sinjar might be cut off from its Syrian base of support – an indication of YPG commitment to its salient into Iraq.

As a senior Kurdish security official told me in April 2017, for the KDP, the second best solution is for Turkey to intervene against the PKK in Sinjar.[15] Intensified Turkish drone operations, probably launched from the KDP’s Suhela camp 90 kilometers to the northeast, were followed by demonstrative Turkish airstrikes[16] on YBŞ and PKK positions in Sinjar on April 25, 2017. A new Turkish-backed offensive by the Rojava Peshmerga seemed to be impending in the lead-up to President Erdoğan’s White House visit on May 16, but the prospect of a major Turkish air and special forces effort later faded away. One interpretation is that intensified provision of U.S. targeting intelligence[17] to Turkey has diverted Turkish attention towards a renewed campaign targeting the PKK leadership in Qandil, where airstrikes have accelerated since late May 2017.[18]

Popular Mobilization Forces and the Syrian border

A new impetus for potential Turkish intervention was provided by the PMF operation launched towards the Syrian-Iraq border on May 12, 2017. The seventeen-day operation saw Iran-backed militias of the Badr Organization and Kataʾib Hezbollah penetrate 100km of sparsely defended desert between their jump-off positions near Tel Afar and the Syrian border.[19] For Turkey, one key fear related to the extension of Iranian proxy forces onto the eastern edge of the northern Syrian theater of operations. With Assad forces creeping towards the Syrian Euphrates River Valley to the southwest,[20] the PMF’s advance created additional concerns that Assad and Iran were positioning to dominate security and political arrangements in post-Islamic State eastern Syria. If Iran were to strike a deal with the YPG, for instance, they would gain an indirect route between Iran and Damascus, albeit via Syrian Kurdish areas. This could give the YPG additional options if their relationship with the United States were to cool post-Raqqa.

As important, from Turkey’s perspective, the PMF’s advance brought the Iraqi Shiʿa militias into direct contact with the PKK, YPG, and Yezidi YBŞ forces in the Sinjar salient. The PMF advance saw the Iraqi forces seize the Yezidi mujamma that the KDP has chosen not to liberate, and saw the PMF establish at least two battalions of Yezidi PMF “hold forces.” KDP-associated Yezidi forces began to suffer desertions to the PMF during May.[21] Eventually, the PMF connected the 35-kilometer stretch of frontline between Sinjar city and the Syrian border held by the PKK, YPG, and Yezidi YBS.

But what happened next may have surprised the Turks. For a couple of years, the dominant narrative in Ankara and Erbil has been that Baghdad and Tehran pay and support the YBŞ via the YPG-held Qamishli airport.[22] Yet, when PMF forces advanced south of Sinjar, there was instead evidence of competing objectives. The PMF began to draw Yezidi recruits away from the YBŞ, while the PKK and YPG did their best to prevent this transfer. As Matthew Barber noted, “One area where the KDP and PKK arch-rivals agree is that Sinjar should be distanced from Baghdad. The PKK’s message to the local Yezidi population has been ‘you are not part of Iraq’. The [PMF] has the opposite message.”[23]

Outlook for Sinjar

We have already dodged two bullets in Sinjar this spring and summer: a major Turkish escalation against the PKK and the chance of KDP-PMF fighting. Are these possibilities like to remain at bay, or does their forestallment merely reflect a calm before the storm? It may be that after Raqqa is liberated, when the YPG is less vital to the United States, Turkey and the KDP will act more resolutely in Sinjar. If the area can be isolated from Syria, then a better-planned Rojava Peshmerga offensive backed by Turkish and KDP Special Forces and heavy weapons could be attempted once again.  One factor to watch is the PMF’s readiness to step in to aid the YBŞ, testing the local Yezidi willingness to trade out the PKK and YPG as protectors. The risks of military setbacks or political opportunism by Baghdad would loom large over any Turkish military escalation in Sinjar.

For Turkey, the optimal outcome may instead involve using soft power to remove the PKK and YPG from Sinjar, leveraging the threat, but not the actual use, of force. This could involve a combination of U.S. and international pressure, Kurdish and/or Iraqi inducements of self-governance, and security guarantees for local Yezidis. Ankara will remain ready to make a “Sinjar for Bashiqa” deal, in which a Baghdad-brokered PKK and YPG departure from Sinjar would result in a Turkish withdrawal from the Bashiqa base, which would constitute a major public relations victory for Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi in the forthcoming election year. A trilateral Iraqi-Kurdish-Yezidi “combined security mechanism,”[24] such as the joint checkpoints and headquarters run by the U.S. military in Sinjar before 2011, might be another option for Turkey to support.

Michael Knights is a Lafer Fellow with The Washington Institute and author of its 2016 report "How to Secure Mosul." He has worked in all of Iraq's provinces and spent time embedded in the country's security forces. mknights[at]washingtoninstitute.org

 [1] Valeria Cetorelli, Isaac Sasson, Nazar Shabila, and Gilbert Burnham, “ISIS' Yazidi Genocide,” Foreign Affairs, June 8, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2017-06-08/isis-yazidi-gen....

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In the midst of the ongoing Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) crisis, Turkey decided to expedite the deployment of 3,000 to 5,000 troops to Qatar.[1] The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP) government also launched a diplomatic campaign in support of its gas-rich ally in the Gulf, which may further escalate regional tensions. Some allege that Turkey’s controversial decision to support Qatar against the coalition of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Egypt results from Qatari financial support for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. However, consideration of Ankara’s wider political aspirations, including its demonstrated will to preserve an active involvement in Middle Eastern political arenas and to counter the US-led international coalition’s Syria policies, reveals a more complex rationale for such unprecedented military and political support.

Gulf in Crisis: Qatar against Arabs

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt imposed severe sanctions on Qatar this month, accusing the tiny, gas-rich monarchy of supporting both Sunni and Shiʿi terrorism throughout the Middle East and North Africa.[2] The Saudi Arabia-led bloc issued statements listing some 50 geographically diverse Sunni and Shiʿi organizations and figures that allegedly receive financial and political support from Qatar. Even though most of the rhetoric concerning Qatar focused on the Al Thani monarchy’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood, militant Shiʿi organizations, like the Bahraini Saraya al-Mokhtar and the Yemen-based Ansar Allah (Houthis), were also included in the GCC statements. The Saudi Arabia-led Arab coalition suspended Qatari participation in the war against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen.[3] Meanwhile, prominent Sunni-jihadist figures, like Abdullah al-Muhaysini and the imam of the Muslim Brotherhood Yusuf al-Qaradawi, were called proxies of the Al Thani regime. In other words, the Arab coalition accused Qatar of supporting terrorist organizations and persons spanning from Shiʿis, considered a threat to Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, to Sunni-jihadists and the Muslim Brotherhood, considered a threat to all Arab regimes.

The dispute between Qatar and the Saudi Arabia-led bloc in the Gulf, Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and its support for several Sunni groups in Syria allegedly linked to al-Qaʿida are not new phenomena. In contrast, the severity of allegations connecting Qatar to Iran represents a departure from the past. In recent years, GCC governments have accused Qatar-based media outlets, such as al-Jazeera, of a pro-Iran bias several times, and criticized Qatar’s unbearable tolerance towards Iran. Nonetheless, Qatar remained an active participant in the Arab coalition opposing Iran-backed Houthis, and purportedly backed Sunni organizations in Syria that have indeed been at odds with Iran and its regional proxies. It should be noted that Qatar rejected these recent allegations, including Bahrain’s claims that the Al Thani regime offered support to Bahrain’s main Shiʿi opposition group, al-Wefaq. A statement released by the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs documents communications with these Shiʿi groups as facilitating mediation efforts, rather than constituting direct support for destabilizing the region’s Sunni-led governments.[4]

Indeed, the Gulf crisis is a multi-faceted case, with allegations of Qatari connections to Iran and to Sunni political Islamist groups spanning from Libya to Yemen. According to the Saudi-led bloc, over the past several years, Qatar has fostered relations with Sunni and Shiʿi adversaries of the GCC and its allies, including the US. The Al Thani leadership was accused of paying $1 billion ransom to an Iranian proxy group in southern Iraq in order to release a Qatari falconry party abducted in 2015.[5] As concrete evidence of allegations, Saudi and UAE outlets’ media campaign against Qatar referenced a report on an official Qatari news agency’s website that portrays the Al Thani monarchy as sympathetic to Iran and Hezbollah. Although Qatar claimed that the report was published on its website by hackers, Iran was the first country to speak out against the ongoing blockade of Qatar, followed by Turkey. Notably, a few days after the outbreak of the Gulf crisis, Hezbollah-linked media outlets published statements by the Yemen-based Houthis announcing that the Iran-backed group was ready to cooperate with Qatar.[6] While many groups in the Iran-linked Shiʿi camp expressed support for Qatar against the Saudi-led bloc’s aggression, the Muslim Brotherhood’s stance was almost singlehandedly represented by Turkey and its president, Erdoğan.

Turkey and the Gulf: Explaining Erdoğan’s Qatar Game

International and Turkish media have put forward several theories attempting to explain Turkey’s support for Qatar in the Gulf crisis. Most of these theories agree that Turkey’s leadership is fearful of corresponding Arab coalition action against Turkey, considering that both Turkey and Qatar have supported the same Sunni groups in Syria and Egypt. However, this explanation fails to address Iran’s role, which is central to the Saudi-led bloc’s allegations against Qatar. Turkey’s unprecedented expedited deployment of forces to Qatar represents a Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East that is far more sophisticated than simple preemptive measures intended to prevent possible corresponding actions against Turkey. Although some accuse Qatar of financially sponsoring AKP in order to ensure Turkish military and diplomatic protection, Qatar’s significance to Turkey has more to do with the fact that Qatar is one of the few arenas in which Turkey has successfully expanded its Middle East influence. This is emphasized by the failure of Turkish projects in Syria, Egypt, Israel-Palestine, and the Gulf.

Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East has undergone a major shift, transitioning from the isolationism of the previous Kemalist regime to various modes of interventionism during the second half of AKP’s single-party rule. Western press and academia often associated the new Turkish foreign policy doctrine, largely attributed to former Prime Minister Ahmed Davutoğlu, with the theory of neo-Ottomanism. This theory was primarily based on the optimistic perspective that Ankara could utilize cultural and religious ties with Sunni-Muslim societies in order to exert a postmodern Ottomanist influence on the region. AKP’s anti-isolationist theory - once adopted as Turkey’s official foreign policy doctrine, with the slogan, “zero problems with neighbors”- faced collapse due to Ankara’s intervention in the Syrian civil war. As Turkey became one of the proud sponsors of the rebellion against Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Ankara’s initial vision of expanding its political influence through cultural and religious ties was replaced with the enactment of indirect military intervention in a neighboring state from 2011-2015. In August 2016, with the start of the Euphrates Shield operation in northern Syria, Turkey converted its off-site support for Syrian rebels into a direct military intervention. The same year marked the construction of a Turkish military base in Qatar, the purpose of which has not been clarified by either Turkish authorities or the Al Thani monarchy. 

After the collapse of the so-called neo-Ottomanist project, Turkey rapidly resorted to military power in its struggle to preserve political influence over the Middle East. In 2015, Turkey established military bases in Somalia and Qatar, and established permanent bases in northern Syria soon after.[7] As Ankara continued to lose the influence it exerted over Iraqi politics via its allies in the country (the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and a small force of Sunni militias led by Atheel al-Nujaifi), Erdoğan’s regime started to prepare for the Tigris Shield military intervention in northeastern Iraq.[8]

In light of Turkey’s modified foreign policy towards the Middle East, one could argue that Ankara fears losing its planned military deployment to Qatar as much as it fears corresponding sanctions by the Saudi-led bloc. Therefore, the recent expedited military deployment may not be intended to serve as immediate operational protection against the Saudi-led bloc, but rather to guarantee the continuation of Turkey’s current Middle East policy doctrine. If this is the case, the expedited deployment supports Qatar’s goals, but may fall short of securing the tiny Gulf emirate against the Saudi-led Arab coalition’s diplomatic, economic, and possible military measures.

However, it must be noted that for the Arab coalition, the Sunni related allegations against Qatar represent the most tolerable part of Qatar’s policies in the region. For example, in Yemen, the Saudi-led Arab coalition has turned a blind eye towards Muslim Brotherhood faction al-Islah. The risk of losing Yemen to an Iran-backed Shiʿi force supersedes the Sunni threat - notwithstanding the threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood to all Arab regimes, including the UAE, the second most active member of the Arab coalition. Therefore, the Saudi-led bloc’s anti-Qatar campaign might well be defined as part of a project to unify Arab ranks against Iran, as supported by the Trump administration. In this case, although denunciations of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Sunni entities serve to expand the Arab coalition to include Egypt, the coalition’s primary objective is reversing the alleged rapprochement between Iran and Qatar.

Turkey’s decision to back Qatar despite its possible connections with Iran is elucidated by Turkey’s Syria policies, which focus on countering the US-led international coalition. The Turkish military intervention of August 2016, which marked a major shift in Turkey’s Middle East policy, came in response to territorial gains by the US-backed Syrian Kurds in northern Syria. Turkey’s rapprochement with Russia and, later that year, with Iran, attempted to counter the US project in Syria.[9] Ankara’s compromises with Russia even included the abandonment of Sunni rebels in Aleppo, a city of symbolic importance to the Syrian rebellion of six years. Ankara was the first to voice opposition to advances by Iran-backed Shiʿi militias in northern Iraqi territory, such as the Turkmen town of Tel Afar. However, Turkey’s practical measures (including limited-scale airstrikes) targeted only the US-allied Kurdish factions in Sinjar, while Shiʿi militias continued to advance in the same region. If the current Saudi-led campaign against Qatar is perceived by Turkey to be another US project further diminishing Turkey’s role, especially in Syria, where Qatar and Turkey-backed factions have been blacklisted, Ankara may maintain its backing of Qatar despite Iran’s alleged involvement with the country.

Ceng Sagnic is a junior researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies (MDC) - Tel Aviv University. He serves as the coordinator of the Kurdish Studies Program and co-editor of Turkeyscope. cengsagnic[at]gmail.com

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Kurdistan flag flying over the Kirkuk Citadel

On March 20, 2017, the governor of Kirkuk Province, Najmaddin Karim, raised the Kurdish flag at the Kirkuk Citadel in the heart of the city of Kirkuk. Among Kurds, the city is known as “Our Jerusalem.” The flag-raising was held in honor of the Kurdish national holiday of Newroz, and was intended to be a symbol of Kirkuk’s central place in the crystallizing entity of Iraqi Kurdistan. The flag-raising was perceived in Baghdad, Tehran, and Ankara as an affront and an attempt to establish facts on the ground in areas that have been disputed since the establishment of Iraq in 1920.[1] Indeed, the angry reactions were not slow in coming, but were ignored by Iraqi Kurds. 

Kirkuk Province’s importance is due to its vast hydrocarbon resources (oil and natural gas) and the ethnic heterogeneity of its citizens. Oil was indeed the driving factor behind the British Empire’s conquest of the Ottoman vilayet of Mosul (which includes today’s Kirkuk Province) from the Ottomans in November 1914, despite the October 1914 ceasefire that had already entered into force. It was also the principal factor in the British decision to attach the vilayet to Iraq in 1926, even though Turkey claimed the area for itself and local Kurds demanded self-government for the region.

Oil also led subsequent Iraqi governments in Baghdad to Arabize Kirkuk Province. New research shows that this policy already started in 1929, when the number of Arab residents in the province stood at only 20 percent of the total.[2] Arabization grew even stronger during the 35 years of Baʿthist rule (1968 to 2003).[3] Following the March 1970 agreement, which granted autonomy to the Kurds of Iraq, the Kirkuk issue became the main bone of contention between Iraq’s Kurds and the central government. The Kurds, led by Mulla Mustafa Barzani, claimed it for themselves based on a 1957 census that showed that the Kurds had a majority in the province.[4] For its part, the government in Baghdad, led by Saddam Hussein, sought to keep the province under its control. The proposed solution was to hold a census to determine if indeed the Kurds held a majority in the province. The census was never held and the Baʿthist regime carried out an aggressive policy to Arabize the region.

The Arabization of Kirkuk included uprooting Kurds – or forcing them to change their nationality to Arab – and the settlement of a large number of Arab families in their place, while providing large financial and economic incentives and falsifying the date of their settlement in the population registry. Baghdad constructed thousands of homes to settle Arabs in Kirkuk Province, while forbidding Kurds from purchasing homes and, most severe of all, deporting 250,000 Kurds to the southern desert of Iraq in order to bring an end, once and for all, to any Kurdish claim to Kirkuk.[5] The demographic engineering of Kirkuk carried out by the Baʿthist regime were most clearly evident in the numbers: While according to the 1957 census, Kurds constituted 48 percent of the population and Arabs 28 percent, in the 1999 census, Kurds amounted to only 21 percent of the population while the number of  Arabs had increased to 72 percent.[6] As for the Turkmen ethnic minority that lived in constant tension with both Arabs and Kurds, they were never a majority in the province; today, while they claim to be a majority in the city of Kirkuk itself this seems unlikely given the demographic changes over the years. For example, the percentage of Turkmen in the province decreased from 21 percent in 1957 to only 7 percent in 1999.[7] 

The Kirkuk question was brought up for discussion after the fall of the Baʿthist regime in 2003. The new 2005 Iraqi Constitution included a specific reference to the Kirkuk question in article 140, which included the following points: (1) The residents who were expelled from Kirkuk Province and other areas as a result of the Arabization policy of previous governments will be able to return and receive compensation, while the new residents relocated by these governments will return to the south; (2) A census will be held in the disputed territories; (3) A public referendum will be held to examine whether the residents of the disputed territories want to be part of Iraq or the autonomous region of Kurdistan.[8] Article 140 was supposed to enter into force by the end of 2007, but Baghdad has not implemented it.

The rise of the Islamic State (IS) and its control over Mosul beginning in June 2014, along with the sudden and total collapse of the Iraqi Army, provided Iraq’s Kurds with the opportunity to exercise control over Kirkuk Province and the other disputed territories. Today they attempt to use this fait accompli on the ground in order to move forward towards de jure independence, since in their view they have achieved control over the territory within the borders of their “imagined” Kurdish state. The flag-raising in Kirkuk, therefore, was symbolic expression of the incremental path to Kurdish independence.

What is the Kurdish strategy for independence and what are the challenges it faces? The decision to adopt independence as a strategic goal came to fruition in 2014, after the Kurds won control over the oil-rich disputed territories, the Baghdad government was severely weakened, and conflicts emerged between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad over various political, military, and economic issues. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and its leader, the president of the Kurdistan Region, Masoud Barzani — along with his nephew, Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, and his son, Security Chief Masrour Barzani —are leading Kurdistan’s drive towards independence. Their strategy was built on five pillars, the first of which was reconciling with their two rival political parties: The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), whose historic leader was Jalal Talabani; and the Goran (“Change”) Party, which was led by Nawshirwan Mustafa.

The main bone of contention between the three parties was the division of power and economic resources, but above all the refusal of President Barzani to relinquish power after a two-year extension to his elected eight-year term in office expired in 2013. The conflict between Goran and the KDP led to the dissolution of parliament in October 2015, creating antagonism between the three major parties. In light of this serious crisis, the KDP initiated a reconciliation with the PUK at the end of 2016. The PUK, which had been weakened by internal party conflicts in the aftermath of Jalal Talabani’s 2012 stroke was more open to this move. Accordingly, after a few rounds of talks with the KDP, the two sides arrived at a new formula for reconciliation and an agreement on holding a public referendum as a first step towards independence. As for Goran, it still hasn’t declared its support for the referendum due to pressure from Iran and its own continued weakness, particularly following the death of the party’s founder and leader, Nawshirwan Mustafa, in May 2017.

The public referendum, which is the second pillar of the Kurdish strategy, is scheduled to take place on September 25, 2017. It will pose one question to the entire population of the Kurdistan region, including those in the disputed territories, asking whether they support independence or not. The objective of the referendum is to provide internal and international legitimacy for independence, as well as make it possible for the Kurds to annex Kirkuk Province and other disputed territories to the Kurdistan region.

It was clear that these steps would be strongly opposed by the government in Baghdad. Hence, the third part of the Kurdish strategy has been to try to reach an understanding with Baghdad so as to facilitate the Kurdish region’s separation from the Iraqi state. The Kurdish leadership believes that if Baghdad agrees to a negotiated separation, it will legitimize the Kurdish state regionally and internationally. Indeed, in the summer-fall of 2016, there was a limited rapprochement between the Kurdish leadership and Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-ʿAbadi, when the two sides came to an understanding on security issues and the Kurdish leadership permitted the Iraqi Army to cross Kurdish territory on its way to fight the Islamic State in Mosul. ʿAbadi was even quoted as saying that the Kurds have the right to self-determination.[9] In all likelihood, ʿAbadi’s stance at that moment was tactical aimed at solving the urgent problem of getting Iraqi forces to Mosul. The fact is that since then there have been no significant developments between the Kurds and ʿAbadi, which is not surprising given the heavy pressure on ʿAbadi from all parts of the Shiʿi camp in Iraq, which is opposed to Kurdish separation.

The fourth aspect of the Kurdish strategy was developing close ties with Turkey, something that began already in 2008. The most meaningful achievement in this respect was the economic lifeline Turkey provided to the Kurdish entity by allowing its independent oil and gas pipelines to pass through its territory.[10] As a result, Kurdish progress towards economic independence has moved forward, but with the heavy price of escalating conflict with Baghdad and increasing Kurdish dependence on Turkey. Turkey appeared to prefer Erbil to Baghdad, particularly in light of the deepening Sunni-Shiʿi rift. Ankara signaled its ties with Erbil by raising the Kurdistan flag outside the Istanbul and Ankara airports during President Barzani’s February 2017 visit.[11] Although the Kurdistan flag was flown alongside the Iraqi flag, the symbolism of flying a Kurdish flag in Turkey, a country that until recently considered such a step heresy, can’t be overstated. A commentator in the London-based Independent, even predicted that Turkey would be one of the first states to recognize an independent Kurdish State in Iraq.[12] Nevertheless, one should also expect Turkey to try and limit the Kurdish drive towards independence. For example, Ankara has been outspoken in support of the

The diplomatic offensive the Kurds are conducting across the world, led by President Barzani, is another part of the Kurdish strategy. This offensive is leveraging the upheaval in Iraq and Syria, and the danger of radical jihadi organizations, in order to present a positive image of Iraqi Kurdistan and seek support for its drive towards independence. The Kurdish leadership cultivates its image by emphasizing the Kurdish Peshmerga fighting the IS, its pro-Western orientation, its strategic alliance with the U.S., the Kurdish region’s stability and its role as a refuge for minorities and displaced persons.

The diplomatic infrastructure that is carrying out this offensive constitutes more than 40 representatives operating around the world. At the same time, there are 36 diplomatic missions in Erbil that serve as embassies in all but name.[13] There is no doubt that the international community understands and even identifies with the Kurds in Iraq far better now than in the past. According to a Kurdish newspaper, already in 2014 a number of states, including the U.S., the U.K., France, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, and several other Arab Gulf states have even informed Kurdish representatives that they “will show understanding if the Kurds declare independence.”[14]

This strategy, which has been carefully calculated and implemented, should not obscure the serious challenges facing the Kurdish leadership. Those who are against independence warn of the danger of civil war within the Kurdish region like the one that is taking place in the new state South Sudan, as well as the potential for a confrontation with Baghdad. An Iranian intervention to subvert independence, using Shiʿi militias such as al-Hashd al-Shaʿbi (Popular Mobilization Units), is a real possibility. Further, Turkey could also initiate a military intervention to prevent the Kurds from annexing Kirkuk. Nevertheless, Kurdish leaders are well aware of these challenges and continue to demonstrate a firm resolve to pursue the path towards independence, which enjoys broad popular support.[15]

It was Jalal Talabani who coined the expression, “Kirkuk is the Jerusalem of the Kurds.”[16] Qubad Talabani, who serves as the KRG’s deputy prime minister, echoed his father on the occasion of the March flag-raising ceremony in Kirkuk, proclaiming, “Congratulations on raising our flag in the Kurdish Jerusalem.” He also mentioned his father’s statement that Kirkuk was the key to solving the Kurdish issue.[17] But Kirkuk is not only a key; it is also a huge barrel of flammable oil, containing a variety of diverse factors and interests, that could explode and thus destroy Kurdish aspirations for independence, if the Kurdish leadership does not handle the issue carefully, patiently, and wisely. 

Ofra Bengio is a Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies (MDC), Tel Aviv University.

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Juba administration forces celebrating the rescue of hostages taken by al-Shabaab, 2014

Since the middle of 2016, al-Shabaab has reemerged as a formidable threat to peace and security in the Horn of Africa. al-Shabaab’s operations have steadily declined since Operation Linda Nchi in 2011, during which the Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali Government troops recaptured territory previously under al-Shabaab’s control. Although a-Shabaab continued to control large swaths of land in southern Somalia, it was not able to maintain its hold on towns or major cities until recently.

The resurgence of the al-Qaʿida linked group seems to be connected to broader developments both inside and outside of Somalia and does not necessarily reflect al-Shabaab’s ability or strength. This essay will examine how AMISOM’s new troop reduction will affect al-Shabaab’s presence in the Horn of Africa and assess whether it still presents challenge to peace and security in the Horn of Africa

Ethiopia’s Troop Withdrawal and AMISOM
AMISOM’s role has been crucial for the peace and security of Somalia and the region as a whole. Since its inception in 2007, AMISOM has assisted the Somali government forces in fighting al-Shabaab and other Islamic militant groups. AMISOM was originally comprised of 22,000 troops from five countries – Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Burundi. However, this was less than half of the 47,000 troops recommended by counter-insurgency doctrine to stabilize and secure Somalia.[1] AMISOM’s forces have been reduced in recent months, as Ethiopia has withdrawn 4,300 of its soldiers. AMISOM also stands to lose another 6,000 Ugandan soldiers by the end of 2017.

In early October 2016, Ethiopia declared a State of Emergency following a year of anti-government protests in which hundreds of protesters were killed and thousands detained. Shortly after, Ethiopia began abruptly withdrawing its troops from southern and central Somalia. Although the Ethiopian government has denied that its troop withdrawal is connected to the unrest at home, the circumstances suggest otherwise. The government claims it has called its troops home due to the financial burden of maintaining its forces in Somalia.

Ethiopia’s withdrawal came as a surprise to the Somali government, AMISOM, and even to al-Shabaab. Ethiopia’s troops are the most experienced and battle hardened of the AMISOM peacekeeping force. They have been involved in the conflicts in Somalia since 2006, gaining valuable counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism experience, which has allowed them to keep Al-Shabaab at bay. Ethiopia’s sudden withdrawal has been a blessing and a change of fortune for al-Shabaab. The Ethiopians withdrew from more than 10 towns in the south and central regions of Somalia. Their absence has allowed al-Shabaab to swiftly fill the vacuum during the past six months, recapturing most of these towns without firing a single shot.

The loss of Ethiopia’s military manpower and experience coupled with the inexperience of Somali government troops makes the fight against al-Shabaab difficult for AMISOM. EU budget cuts to AMISOM have allowed Al-Shabaab to take advantage of AMISOM’s limited resources. al-Shabaab has used large swaths of Somali land as safe havens, given that AMISOM does not have the necessary resources to monitor such a broad chunk of territory. With AMISOM operations expected to be concluded in 2020, and troop withdrawal to begin by 2018, it is difficult to imagine how it will succeed in ridding Somalia of Al-Shabaab.[2]

The Spillover Effect of al-Shabaab Operations
For the past year al-Shabaab has managed to carry out devastating terror attacks in the central and southern regions of Somalia. It has been responsible for more than 20 attacks since mid-2016. The most significant attacks were an attack on a Kenyan military base in which 57 soldiers were killed in June 2016; a January 2017 suicide bombing in Mogadishu that killed 28 people; and the June 2017 storming of a military compound in Puntland, which killed 70 people.[3]

In addition, Somalia’s neighbors in the Horn of Africa are still targets of al-Shabaab terrorism. Since the beginning of May 2017, Kenya has been repeatedly hit by terror attacks in the Mandera area, in northeastern Kenya, including an attack that targeted the regional governor and killed eight members of his security detail. The Mandera region has always been a prime target for Al-Shabaab due to its proximity to the border with southern Somalia, which is partly controlled by al-Shabaab.[4]  al-Shabaab operations were also foiled in both Kenya and Ethiopia. al-Shabaab takes advantage of Somalia’s vast and unmonitored borders with Kenya and Ethiopia to carry out its attacks. Although both countries have a significant Somali population, a long border with Somalia, and have contributed to the AMISOM force, al-Shabaab has only managed to attack Kenyan targets successfully and failed to carry out a successful attack or operation in Ethiopia. The security apparatus in Ethiopia is often credited with being more capable than its neighbors due to its experience in dealing with different militant opposition forces that have operated in the north of the country for the past 20 years and the Somali Ogaden region for the past 40 years.[5]

It is difficult to assume that al-Shabaab has an international scope, however, the group has been able to radicalize and recruit youngsters from the West, primarily from the Somali diaspora. International recruits receive weapons training, intelligence gathering, suicide attacks and the like to fight AMISOM and Somali Government forces. This gives Al-Shabaab an international dimension.

al-Shabaab’s Internal and External Resources of Funding
al-Shabaab financiers range from states to charities and individuals. Apart from donations, al-Shabaab, it is said, has been able to generate money on its own, and its sources of funding underscore its international support. The diaspora is still Al-Shabaab’s strongest source of funding.[6] Based on clan membership, the diaspora continues to pump money through Somali “hawalas” (informal money transfer networks). Al-Shabaab independently generates funds by extorting money from businesses, hijacking humanitarian aid, kidnapping, and receiving payment from the Dubai-based Dahabshil money transfer company for services it provides in the regions it controls. The group has also been able to tax residents living in those Somali regions.

Now that al-Shabaab is back on the offensive, it is likely to seek control over the port city of Kismayo, which it effectively used before it was driven out by AMISOM in 2011. During its time in Kismayo, Al-Shabaab heavily taxed as much as 30 percent of the import-export business through the port, generating an estimated $1 million quarterly. Al-Shabaab is also believed to be linked with pirates that operate in the Gulf of Aden.

Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa
Security in the Horn of Africa has been elusive for quite some time. Western embassies in the Horn and Eastern Africa have issued travel advisories to their citizens, warning or cautioning against travel in the region. The international community sees the advent of Al-Shabaab as a threat of international peace and security. Al-Shabaab’s ties with al-Qaʿida, by definition makes it part of an international terror network.

Historically, there have been large Somali populations in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. In addition, almost two-thirds of Somali refugees reside in neighboring countries, with Ethiopia and Kenya accommodating almost 1 million refugees between them.[7] This dispersed population, which shares the same ethnicity, religion, and language has the potential to be fertile ground for Al-Shabaab recruitment. The proximity of the region to the Middle East, primarily Yemen, which has one of the most active al-Qaʿida networks, makes the Al-Shabaab threat even more of a danger to the Horn of Africa.

The Trump administration recently eased restrictions on drone and air strikes that had been put into place by the Obama administration. It has also defined Somalia as an “area of active hostilities,” allowing for raids by U.S. special operation forces and conventional forces.[8] The American government has already initiated drone strikes and ground operations using its elite special forces.[9] In late March 2017, the Pentagon confirmed that it was sending dozens of troops to Somalia, decades after it pulled out its troops following the Black Hawk Down incident in 1993.[10] However, this increased US military activity may not be enough to win the war against Al-Shabaab. The military operations presumably would push Al-Shabaab out of its newly acquired towns and villages, but they will not diminish the visible al-Shabaab presence in the region.

In February, Somalia elected a new president. Although the new government is still fragile, Somali-American President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed has shown a willingness to confront Islamic militants by declaring a new offensive. The US should help the new government to build its capacity to fight al-Shabaab. The US and the EU should encourage AMISOM to stay and finish the job by funding its activities. The war against Al-Shabaab cannot be won by drone and air strikes, it requires troops on the ground that can provide a sustained presence for stable security in Somalia.

Alexander Takele holds a M.A in Government Studies from the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, Israel.  He is a research intern at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University.

Between 12-14 June 2017, Academic Head of the Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation at the MDC, Dr. Itamar Radai, attended the 33rd Annual Conference of the Association for Israel Studies held at Brandeis University. On 12 June, Dr. Radai presented a paper entitled, "al-Madaniyyat: An Alternative Civil Agenda for the Arab Citizens" as part of a panel entitled, "The Palestinian Arab Citizens in Israel: Between Political Divergence and Civil Convergence."