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From Twitter: A poster condemning Assad, with the caption “Just wait, murderer: tomorrow you will pay the ‎price.” 

The horrific chemical attack against the village of Khan Sheikhun in Syria, resulting in many children's deaths, deepened the rift between the Palestinians and the Syrian regime, further deteriorating a relationship already decayed by six years of Syrian civil war.[1]Fatah and other organizations in the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Palestinian diaspora condemned the attack and called for the perpetrators to be held accountable. While Fatah supporters in the West Bank attributed the attack to the Syrian regime and sought to distance themselves from its traditional support for the Palestinians, Hamas leadership refrained from direct accusation. Others rejected the accusations that the Syrian regime was involved in the attacks. These primarily Palestinian leftists, supported by the regime, instead proposed conspiracy theories about the involvement of Western countries, Israel, and several Arab states in the attack.

Many Palestinian users expressed deep shock at the chemical attack against the Syrian village and described those responsible for the operation as “terrorists.” For example, a user from Bethlehem wrote that the attack was “a disgrace to humanity's conscience. The blood of innocents was spilled. Tyranny must be ended and the criminals punished.” Other users criticized the lack of an international response, particularly from the Arab world, in the face of the atrocities. As one user from the West Bank wrote, “What if the nationality of these children was British? In that case, the world would wake up and not be passive. Even the leaders of the Arab countries would condemn and protest. But this child is an Arab child, and everything remains the same except the way [the children of Syria] die.” [2] Muhammad al-Sultan,  head of the Student Council of the Islamic University in Gaza, also protested, “Women and the elderly face collective destruction because of international and Arab silence.”[3] Others were concerned that the attack would exacerbate the civil war.

Some prominent Palestinian users accused Assad’s regime of genocide. For example, Bilal Muhammad Abdel-Aal, a Gaza teen whose popular songs denounce Israel and praise lone Palestinian attackers, uploaded a Facebook video of acerbic verses condemning Assad. He called the Syrian president a “Zionist murderer,” stressing that shedding Muslim blood crossed a red line and that Assad would pay the consequences.[4] In Ramallah, activists rallied to condemn the Syrian attack, insistently rejecting Syrian aid to the Palestinian cause, claiming that the regime was carrying out genocide. The demonstrators waved signs reading, “Palestine renounces the crimes committed by the butcher of Damascus” and “We don’t want the keys to Jerusalem if they are immersed in the blood of children.” In addition, the demonstrators demanded the release of all Palestinian prisoners held in Syrian prisons and the lifting of the siege on the Palestinian Yarmouk refugee camp south of Damascus.[5] These demands were influenced by a broad internet campaign that Palestinian-Syrians began in January, demanding details about the fate of 12,000 Palestinian prisoners detained in Syria, under the hashtag, “Where are the detainees?” [6]

However, others chose to downplay the event. Notably, leaders of Hamas condemned the chemical attack, but refrained from directly accusing the Syrian regime – likely because of the traditionally complex relationship between Hamas and the Assad regime. On the eve of the civil war, Hamas was included in “the axis of resistance” (al-muqawama) to which Syria belonged. However, this positive relationship was disrupted by the civil war and the closure of Hamas offices in Damascus during the summer of 2012. Hamas' rivals, particularly Fatah, have attacked Hamas for its close relationship with the Syrian regime. Regardless, it appears that for now, the Hamas leadership prefers not to oppose the Syrian regime for its crimes against civilians, instead condemning only the attack itself. For example, senior Hamas figure Izzat al-Rasheq tweeted, “Hamas explicitly condemns the ugly massacre that took place today... and the use of chemical weapons against the residents."[7] However, Hamas supporters free of leadership considerations uploaded sharper condemnations inconsistent with the organization's policy. For example, at a protest organized by the Hamas-affiliated student group al-Qatla al-Islamiya in Gaza, the Syrian regime was called a “Criminal who is responsible for the massacre,” and placards read, “Khan Sheikhun is suffocating” and, “The children of Syria are dead.”[8]

In contrast, some left-wing Palestinian activists inside and outside Syria, such as members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which is supported by the Syrian regime, denied that the attack had occurred and cleared the Syrian regime of guilt. Taha al-Khatib, a Palestinian commentator who lives in Egypt, exemplifies this position. He claimed that the pictures of the children killed in Khan Sheikhun‎ were forged and the reports of a chemical attack were false. Moreover, according to al-Khatib, the United States was unable to present a single picture proving that the wounded were in hospitals in Turkey. He further charged that Israel and Turkey had buried chemical charges in Khan Sheikhun intended to explode in the wake of a Syrian attack. This would allow for the accusation that the regime had perpetrated a massacre, generating international public support for a strike in Syria.[9] A left-wing Palestinian user from Syria wrote that just as the US had falsified data on the existence of chemical weapons in Iraq to justify its attack on Iraq, it was now falsifying data on Syria. Others sought to exploit the events in Syria to increase resistance against Israel. For example, Tamim al-Barghouti, a Palestinian poet in Egypt supportive of the Syrian regime, claimed that the “barbaric act” ensnares Syria in an ethnic war that deepens its rifts. According to al-Barghouti, the only extrication option is intensified resistance against Israel through concentration of forces in the south. [10]

On the other hand, Palestinian users in Syria and abroad heavily criticized supporters of the Syrian regime for expressing audacious solidarity with “the chief murderer Bashar al-Assad.” In Ramallah, demonstrators chanted, “No to the left if it stands beside Bashar.” [11] One user wondered how Palestinians could stand by Assad while Jews were expressing solidarity with the children of Khan Sheikhun.[12]

The reactions on social media to the Syrian regime and the massacre in Khan al-Sheikhun articulate fissures between significant segments of the Palestinian people. Geopolitical and internal political contexts influence attitudes towards an issue that is not directly related to the Palestinian cause. Hamas leadership's failure to explicitly blame the Syrian regime underscores a difficult dilemma. Hamas fears the erasure of any remnants of its positive relationship with Syria and, no less importantly, with Assad’s main ally, Iran. This stance, combined with West Bank Palestinian leadership's unwillingness to advance the problem of the Palestinian prisoners in Syria, is liable to drive a wedge between the Palestinian diaspora and Hamas and Fatah leadership. The discourse also displays the influence of Palestinian left-wing activists' strong pro-Syria stance, resulting in refusal to recognize the regime’s crimes – a refusal that many users find immoral.

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From Twitter: A picture of U.S President Donald Trump, with the words, "We love you."

On April 7, US destroyers fired 59 cruise missiles at the Syrian army’s al-Shaerat base, responding to the chemical attack against Khan Sheikhun three days earlier‎, which Syrian rebels and most of the world attributed to the Assad regime. The American attack evoked strong reactions from Syrian activists and refugees on social networking sites (SNS). They expressed anger and fury at the regime, along with euphoria and optimism in response to the American intervention. Surrealistically, US President Donald Trump, known for his controversial statements about Islam and his attempts to impose an executive order to prevent Muslim immigrants from entering the United States, became the darling of many Syrians. These surprising expressions of support for Trump are contextualized by many Syrians' perception of the Obama administration and the international community as apathetic to Syria's civil war.

The chemical attack in Khan Sheikhun on April 4[1] killed at least 86 people, most of them women and children, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. [2] Laboratory tests conducted by British and Turkish scientists found that the chemical substance used in the attack was Sarin gas. [3] Unsurprisingly, Syrian President Bashar Assad denied the Syrian regime’s responsibility for the attack and claimed that “the chemical attack was completely fabricated.” [4]

The chemical attack was strongly condemned throughout the world, and also provoked angry responses from Syrian activists on SNS. These responses were shared as part of a virtual campaign launched on Twitter under the hashtag “Chemical Assad” in Arabic and English.[5] The tweets included pictures showing the bodies of children killed in the attack and expressions of outrage against Assad. According to one Syrian user, “The world will not forget Assad’s crime in Syria and the killing of the children by [Assad] the chemist.”[6] An account associated with the Syrian revolution published a call to online activists to use this hashtag for two purposes; to decry the massacre in Khan Sheikhun, and to remember “al-Ghutta al-Sharqiya in 2013,” a deadly chemical attack in August 2013 also attributed to the Syrian regime, which caused the deaths of hundreds of people.[7] Another tweet showed Assad’s photograph, with the bodies of child victims of the chemical attack in Khan Sheikhun in the background, and the caption “Chemical Assad Selfie” (see photo). [8]

The chemical attack against the Syrian town not only led to international condemnation, but also to an unusual American military response against the Syrian regime. Trump stated that the attack “changed his mind” about Assad and “crossed a lot of lines."[9] This statement was a reminder of former US President Barack Obama’s famous August 2012 statement that drew a “red line,” warning the Assad regime not to use chemical weapons. However, that warning was not enforced when the 2013 use of chemical weapons was attributed to the Syrian regime. In response to the attack in Khan Sheikhun, Trump declared that military action was in the interests of “the supreme national security of the United States to prevent and deter the proliferation and use of lethal chemical weapons.” [10]

The American attack was the first military action by the international community against the Syrian regime since the outbreak of the civil war in March 2011. This marked the new, aggressive line taken by the Trump administration towards the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons. As a result, it elicited enthusiastic reactions from many Syrians. Bana al-’Abed, a seven-year-old girl who became famous for her tweets from besieged Aleppo,[11] tweeted, “I am a Syrian girl who suffered under Bashar Assad and Putin. I welcome Donald Trump’s action against the murderers of my people."[12] A Syrian user living in Sweden wrote, “As a Syrian refugee, I never imagined I would say this: Thank you Donald Trump for bombing the regime that uprooted me, please do more.” [13] Qassem Eid, a former Syrian rebel who fled to the United States, wrote, “As a Syrian and survivor of Assad’s chemical massacre [in 2013], I want to thank the President of the United States for attacking the dictator, you gave me hope [...] may God bless you, sir.”[14] In an interview on CNN, Eid continued, “For more than six years, we asked [the world] for protection, and today for the first time it happened. Today, unlike in the past, Assad is being held responsible for his crimes against humanity.” Beyond this attack, he urged Trump to work to create no-fly zones in Syria and eliminate the planes remaining in Assad’s air force, preventing the regime from continuing to bombard Syrian citizens. To date, this interview has been viewed more than 3.6 million times on YouTube. [15]

In another expression of Syrian users’ support for the American attack, many users changed their profile pictures to a picture of Trump accompanied by the Arabic inscription, “We love you” (menakhabak), which quickly became a meme circulating among Syrian Twitter users. [16] Changing profile pictures expressed not only appreciation for Trump, but also defiance of Assad, whose image accompanied by “We Love You” is displayed on billboards throughout Damascus. This image and inscription are also common among supporters of the Syrian regime on SNS. [17]

The chemical attack on Khan Sheikhun was the most recent episode in the Syrian civil war's long list of atrocities. Although the world has been consistently aware of this series, only the most recent episode led to an exceptional American attack on the Syrian regime. It is highly doubtful that this attack will change the face of the battle in Syria, or save the lives of Syrian civilians subjected to daily attacks by the Assad regime. However, lacking any practical pathways for the civilian population to oppose the regime and impact the dynamics of the ongoing conflict, SNS provide civilians with the space to express protest, anger, and frustration at the regime’s actions, as well as satire and triumph in response to American actions. The enthusiastic discourse on SNS illustrates many Syrians' desire for significant international intervention in Syria, ending the country's civil war and its accompanying humanitarian disaster.

Head of the Doron Halpern Middle East Network Analysis Desk, Dr. Harel Chorev, appeared on "Erev Chadash," where he discussed the recent election of Ismail Haniyeh to be head of Hamas. The full interview can be watched here. From 12:00,  in Hebrew.

Head of Africa Studies Dr. Irit Back was in the media on two separate occasions on 9 May 2017. The first appearance was on "The International Hour" (Reshet Bet), where she spoke about the situation in Nigeria following the condition of the Nigerian President and the partial release of hostages held by Boko Haram.  The second apperance was on "Retzuat HaBitachon" on Galei Tzahal [Army Radio], where she discussed the role of African regional organizations in solving local conflicts. 

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The Middle East that President Trump inherited, observed the veteran commentator Hisham Melham in November 2016, was “figuratively and in some places literally unraveling.” Melham noted that alienated officials throughout the Middle East had blamed the Obama administration for not confronting Iran on its military interventions in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen; the explosive rise of the Islamic State; and especially for its failure to uphold its red line and punish the Asad regime for using chemical weapons against civilians in 2013. As a result, President Trump was cautiously welcomed by these officials as the embodiment of “anybody but Obama.”[1]  

Yet during his first four months in office, many in the American media, academy, and former officials have argued that there has been more continuity than change in Trump’s Middle East policies.[2] In February, The New York Times reported that Trump was “embracing some key pillars of the former administration’s strategy,”[3] while another observer described Trump's foreign policy as “Obama Lite – the exact same policies, implemented by the exact same people.”[4] Nonetheless, in almost every Trump declaration one can see the new president shadow boxing with the Obama legacy; if there is one “overarching theme” to Trump’s foreign policies, it is a rejection of Obama’s approach.[5]

First, and most broadly, Trump does not appear committed to retrenchment.[6] Trump is not trying to reduce American commitments abroad in the name of strengthening the U.S. at home. Trump appears to want the "brilliant incoherence" of foreign-policy activism without assuming the costs of his predecessors.[7]

In terms of the Middle East, perhaps the most visible practical change in the Trump approach has been its coordination with Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. While Obama kept those states at arm’s length, Trump’s team appears to be closely coordinating its regional policy with King Abdullah II of Jordan, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of Egypt, and King Salman (and his son, Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman) in Saudi Arabia.[8] Trump wants to work through these regimes to achieve its three Middle East priorities: defeating the Islamic State (IS); implementing a ceasefire and a plan for political transition in Syria; and, a regional agreement on Israeli-Palestinian peace.[9]

The second clear break from the Obama approach in Trump’s Middle East policy is its approach to Iran. The Economist referred to the Trump posture on Iran as “A new confrontation.”[10] Indeed, on April 19, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson issued a confrontational five-minute public statement on Iran saying, “Today I’d like to address Iran’s alarming and ongoing provocations that export terror and violence destabilizing more than one country at a time…Iran spends its treasure and time disrupting peace.”[11] Moreover, he explicitly rejected Obama’s biggest foreign policy legacy, the nuclear deal with Iran, claiming that the JCPOA “only delays [Iran’s] goal of becoming a nuclear state.” Again sharply breaking with the Obama policy, Tillerson said, “This deal represents the same failed approach of the past that brought us to the current imminent threat we face with North Korea,” adding that “the Trump administration has no intention of passing the buck to a future administration on Iran.”

Beyond defeating the Islamic State by seizing its putative Syrian capital, Raqqa,[12] a clear picture of the broad U.S. policy for Syria has yet to emerge.[13] This has led some critics to argue that Trump is simply continuing Obama's policy there.[14]The Economist labeled Trump's policy "confused," arguing "any lingering notion that Mr. Trump might strike a grand bargain with Russia over Syria is dead."[15] In any case, those who still entertain the notion of a US-Russian "grand bargain"[16] that would concede Russia's position in Ukraine and the Crimea, in exchange for Russian compromise in Syria minimize the changing context in Syria, which has presented Russia with diminishing returns on its military intervention since early 2016.[17] Such a situation provides strong incentives, independent of the logic of a grand bargain, for Russia to seek a new arrangement in Syria, one that would allow it to lock-in its strategic gains, while transferring responsibility for the conflict to others.[18]

On May 1, just prior to a multilateral diplomatic conference on Syria in Astana, Kazakhstan, Putin and Trump discussed achieving a cease-fire in Syria. During a press conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Sochi before the call with Trump, Putin dismissed an opportunity to critique the U.S.'s April 7 airstrikes on the Asad regime and went out of his way to say that “Certainly, without involvement of such a country as the U.S., these problems [in Syria] cannot be solved efficiently.”[19] Kremlin officials have said that Putin will be trying to sell the U.S. the idea of creating four security zones in Syria to enforce a national cease-fire.[20]

In doing so, Russia is essentially embracing an idea that Trump himself floated in late January 2017.[21] Indeed, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov pointed out that the "de-escalation zones," which were formally agreed to by Russia, Turkey, and Iran at the Astana gathering[22] and that went into effect on May 6 — were an American idea.[23] Setting aside the enormously complex mechanics of successfully implementing the Astana agreement,[24] one must ask why Russia is going out of its way to publicize its coordination with the Trump administration on the Syria diplomatic process.

It is important to point out that the newly declared de-escalation zones do not include almost all of northeast and eastern Syria (see map, below), which are the areas predominantly controlled by the Islamic State and the Syrian Kurds. These are also the areas where U.S. military forces, in coordination with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF),[25] are preparing for the operation to retake the IS stronghold in Raqqa.[26]

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Source: Anadolu Agency, Turkey

Therefore, there may be a broader understanding evolving between the U.S. and Russia to divide Syria into zones of influence.[27] Based on their respective military deployments, it appears that Russia would be responsible for the areas broadly defined as west of the north-south axis that includes Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Homs, and Damascus (covered by the Astana agreement), while the U.S. would be responsible for the territories east of the same axis.[28]If this is what is happening, then in the best-case these zones of influence would be laying the groundwork for some kind of de-facto decentralization or federalism in Syria.[29] This depends on whether the new Astana agreement can wind down the fighting between the regime and rebels in the Russian zone (a big "if" indeed[30]) on the one hand; and, on the other hand, whether the U.S. and its Kurdish and Sunni allies can decisively defeat the IS in Raqqa and Deir az-Zour,[31] and "go the extra mile of translating its presence into leverage to end the cycle of violence" in eastern Syria.[32]

Russia, however, may also be considering another scenario. The de-escalation zones provide it with a framework with which to coordinate (and regulate) the conduct of its partners (Asad, Turkey, Iran) and eliminate jihadi rebels in the territory it considers "useful Syria."[33] Nevertheless, by ceding responsibility for the east to the U.S., Russia would be leaving it to adjudicate unresolved disputes over the territory in northeastern and eastern Syria. Russia may be anticipating that the U.S. will find itself enmeshed in a new phase of conflict as a result. [34] In a post-IS Syria, Turkey will be seeking to prevent Kurdish autonomy in northeast Syria along the Turkish border,[35] and Iran will be seeking to secure at least one overland corridor from Iran and Iraq through Syria to the Mediterranean.[36] Further, jihadis may seek to regroup in the frontier zone of southern and eastern Syria if and when they are defeated in Raqqa. Any or all of these challenges could turn into a new and prolonged phase of conflict for U.S. For Russia, the zones of influence arrangement would allow it to better limit the Asad regime's freedom of action, leaving the door open to a negotiated settlement to the war.[37] At the same time, it would allow Russia to preserve its partnerships with Turkey and Iran, without assuming the responsibility for confronting them in the contested areas of eastern Syria. In other words, Russia may be trying to establish an arrangement with the U.S. based on the principle that each side will accept what the other is doing in the area it controls, the area most vital to its interests. The rub here is that in the Russian zone of influence the plan is for the fighting to wind down, while in the U.S. zone of influence it appears there may be a new post-IS phase of conflict.

The Syrian challenge confronting the Trump administration is almost identical to the one that faced Obama: how can the U.S. play a more decisive role in in Syria without assuming an open-ended military and financial burden that it promised it would avoid. Consistent with its policy of tacking in the opposite direction of Obama's policies, Trump's national security team appears to be preparing a strategy for leaning in rather than staying out of the Syrian war.[38] While one former Obama administration official has warned Trump against "the strategic suicide" of pursuing an alignment with Russia in Syria,[39] it now appears that it is Russia that is modestly courting a skeptical Trump administration.[40]

Brandon Friedman is a Researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies (MDC), Tel Aviv University. 

סייד קוטב (1966-1906) היה אחד מהוגי הדעות החשובים של הפונדמנטליזם האסלאמי.  שניים מכתביו החשובים מופיעים כאת, לראשונה בתרגום לעברית.  שני הספרים הם בעלי אופו פולמוסי ומציגים את עמדתו הלוחמנית של קוטב כלפי שתי "מתחרותיה"המונותאיסטיות של דת האסלאם. בעוד בספר האחד מתפלמס קוטב עם הנצרות ועם תרבות המערב, מציג ספרו השני, בחלקו, את עמדתו כלפי היהודים, הכוללת יסודות אנטישמיים. קריאת שני הספרים חשובה להבנת משנתו הרעיונית של קוטב ומושגי היסוד שלה. 

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Turkish Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 8 May 2017

Normalization of fragile relations between Jerusalem and Ankara, which was achieved in June 2016 following considerable diplomatic efforts, brought about a period of reduced tension between the two countries. This period ended on May 8, when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called for Turkish citizens to visit Jerusalem and strongly criticized Israel's proposed "Muezzin Law" at the “Jerusalem Foundations” summit held in Turkey. The timing of Erdoğan’s comments was not a coincidence; the proposed legislation in Israel has inflamed sentiments in Turkey, as it fueled public debate in Israel.

Israeli supporters of the law assert that the law is not anti-Islamic, referring  to Egypt’s laws that prohibit the use of amplifying devices in mosques during hours of rest. Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of Turkish media view the story in an entirely different light.

In almost every case, the Turkish media does not engage with the issue of amplification devices in mosques, instead arguing that Israel is violating Muslims' freedom of religion and worship by banning morning prayers altogether. In light of a trend of increasing Turkish religiosity, it is not surprising that the Israeli Knesset's proposed legislation has seized headlines and become a subject of discussion on social media in Turkey.

Beyond playing on the heartstrings of religious sentiment, Erdoğan's sharp rhetoric against Israel provides him with leverage in internal politics and foreign policy.  Erdoğan's approach has remained consistent since the diplomatic incident at the Davos Summit of 2009. Then, against the backdrop of Israeli "Operation Cast Lead," Erdoğan railed against the late former Israeli President Shimon Peres by shouting, "You know very well how to kill people," and stormed off the stage following Peres' subsequent defense of Israel's position.

This rhetoric paid off for Erdoğan at the ballot box and beyond; at the time of the Davos Summit, Erdoğan was considered by the Arab public to be one of the most popular leaders in the Muslim world.

Erdoğan identified and understood the instrumental value of religion in managing his country, and began his campaign to Islamicize secular Turkey through the Turkish Religious Affairs Authority, known as "Diyanet." In 2002, the budget of this governmental body was approximately 550 million Turkish liras. Today, its five-year allocation stands at approximately 40 billion Turkish liras. For Erdoğan, 8 billion a year is a bargain. With the help of this generous budget, the Religious Affairs Authority provides religious services to Sunni citizens. Beyond this, the Authority is also responsible for building mosques worldwide, from Maryland, United States to Cologne, Germany. Additionally, the Authority has begun to influence the daily lives of ordinary Turkish citizens by distributing nonbinding religious rulings through television, radio, the Internet, and social media.

This Islamicization quickly percolated, and soon produced a revolution of the Turkish public consciousness, affecting tourism and pilgrimage to the holy cities of Islam. In 2014, Jerusalem was added to the list of destinations for Turkish pilgrims, namely those intending to visit Mecca and Medina. With this important step, the Authority declared unequivocally that it planned to return Jerusalem to the Turkish-Islamic consciousness. Against the backdrop of these developments, the head of the Religious Affairs Authority Mehmet Görmez visited Jerusalem in 2015 and prayed at the Temple Mount.  

When taking into account the unfolding events in Turkey, Erdoğan's recent call for Turkish citizens to visit Jerusalem should surprise no one. Erdoğan's Islamist worldview determines Turkey's position regarding the the potential decision to move the United States Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem – a scenario which Turkey is working through all available channels to prevent. Turkey has warned U.S President Trump not to move "one stone" in the Holy Land, lest it provoke an immediate escalation in the region.

Unlike the period that preceded the normalization of relations between Israel and Turkey, Erdoğan is now undertaking preventive measures. In contrast to the past, he is not simply attacking Israel for its own sake. With this, the Turkish president has proven once again that the end of President Obama's administration – which knew how to show Netanyahu the cold shoulder – and the beginning of President Trump's administration – which has been embraced warmly by  Israeli leadership – has elicited a redesign of Turkish foreign policy toward Israel.

Turkey aims to protect its important ties with the United States, and because of this, refrains from instigating direct conflict with Israel. However, Erdoğan's incendiary speech at the Jerusalem Summit in Turkey on May 8 showed that when he feels conflict has been imposed upon him by Israel, and when he feels he must take preventive measures, the Turkish president has no intention of sitting in silence.

 This article originally appeared in Hebrew on Walla! 

Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak is a junior researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies (MDC), Tel Aviv University. He serves as Turkey analyst for the Doron Halpern Network Analysis Desk  and is co-editor of Turkeyscope.  hayeytan[at]tauex.tau.ac.il

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Flags of Turkey and the European Union. Illustrative.

Turkey’s three decade dream of European Union membership is on the brink. Turkey’s EU accession is dying, but neither side has officially called for termination. This deteriorating situation can also be referred to as an interregnum that has placed precarious Turkey-EU relations in limbo. Never before in the history of the modern Turkey have Turkish decision-makers and European leaders made critical public statements about each other, expressing uneasiness over the current state of relations. The only way out of this impasse is the renewal of committed EU accession talks for Turkey.

After Germany and the Netherlands prohibited Turkish politicians from campaigning in their countries for the recent referendum, Turkey’s President Erdoğan accused German and Dutch leaders of following "Nazi practices," and called the EU "fascist" and "cruel," accusing it of engaging in a crusade against the Islam.[1] Meanwhile, European leaders were not idle as in the face of belligerent rhetoric from Turkish politicians. For instance, Volker Bouffier, Vice-Chairman of Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union, harshly responded, “Mr. Erdoğan and his government are not welcome in our country, and that must be now be understood”.[2]

Some of these public statements can be explained by domestic pressure on leaders, who were using the foreign policy card in their election campaigns. For example, President Erdoğan reaped the rewards of anti-Western sentiment in the constitutional referendum of April 16, 2017, gaining expanded executive powers.[3] Additionally, over the past decade, under the country’s ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP), Turkish politics has become more authoritarian and the rule of law has been largely violated. Following the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016, the Council of Europe put Turkey on the watchlist, due to the country’s deteriorating human rights record.[4] However, the general trend of Turkish-EU relations reflects a structural change that is not fully explained by domestic political considerations or Turkey’s shift towards authoritarian politics that undermine the rule of law.

Recent statements from Turkey and European countries show that their focus has strayed from Turkey’s EU accession. In the aftermath of his narrow victory in the referendum, President Erdoğan continued to use anti-EU rhetoric, saying that Turkey might hold a referendum to reinstate the death penalty and withdraw its EU accession bid.[5] President Erdoğan’s desire to reinstate capital punishment elicited a strong reaction from Brussels. President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker responded to the Turkish President by saying that the death penalty “would be the reddest of all red lines.”[6]

There are some in Ankara who argue that President Erdoğan is deliberately provoking Brussels into terminating Turkey’s EU membership bid in order to be released from the legal and political requirements imposed by the accession process.[7] However, as veteran journalist Murat Yetkin observed, termination would be a nightmare scenario. Not only would it damage Turkey’s economic and political conditions, but it would also eliminate the EU's normative power – and an unstable Turkey represents a major security risk to the EU. Indeed, Hans-Georg Maassen, the head of the German domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz – BfV), recently warned that the spillover effect of the conflicts in Turkey and Syria are highly threatening to Europe.[8]

Without accession talks, Brussels would not hold the leverage necessary to prevent Turkey from destabilizing further. Dr. Paul T. Levin, an expert on Turkish-EU relations at Stockholm University, explained, “The promise of full membership was the carrot that once arguably propelled reform. With that promise gone, so is the leverage that the EU once held over Turkey. Other inducements, like visa liberalization and the 'modernization' of the Customs Union, do not have the same power of attraction. But the EU is still by far Turkey’s biggest trading partner, so there should reasonably be limits to how much Ankara will want the relationship to deteriorate.”[9]

Following the EU-Turkey refugee deal of March 2016, the transactional dimension of the relations has been tested. Although both sides have incentives to develop “wise relations,” without the emphasis on accession, Turkey-EU relations continue to deteriorate. Lucia Najslova, an assistant professor of EU affairs at Charles University in Prague, explains that “regardless of Turkey’s attitude to EU accession, the expectation that a candidate will do more than members simply violates and contradicts the logic of accession process.”[10]

Therefore, in order to endure the interregnum in Turkish-EU relations without further harm to both sides, Ankara and Brussels should realize that their mutual dependency is deeply rooted and multilayered. Thus, instead of openly hostile remarks in public, wise politics should be implemented immediately to return to “a committed” accession process. Otherwise, a fragile, transactional Turkish-EU relationship will inevitably deteriorate further.

Egemen Bezci is a visiting researcher at Stockholm University Institute of Turkish Studies.

On Sunday, 21 May 2017, MDC Director Prof. Uzi Rabi will participate in the Annual John Gandel Symposium on the Middle East, held as part of the 2017 TAU Board of Governors meeting.  Appearing with Prof. Rabi will be Lt. Gen. (res.) Moshe (Bogi) Ya'alon, former IDF Chief of Staff and former Defense Minister.  

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Uzi Rabi and Moshe 'Bogie' Ya'alon

On 21 May 2017, the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies participated in the Annual John Gandel Symposium on the Middle East.  The Forum this year was chaired by Mr. Richard Sincere, National Chairman of the American Friends of Tel Aviv University.  In attendence were members of the Tel Aviv University Board of Governors, and interested members of the public and press. 

Sharing the stage were MDC Director Prof. Uzi Rabi and former IDF Chief of Staff and former Defense Minister Lt. General (res.) Moshe (Bogie) Ya'alon, who each provided his insight into the significant challenges facing the region. Ya'alon argued that one cannot try to seek a 'quick fix' for the region's ills; the problems are too drastic. Instead, like-minded powers should work together, as is now being done, in defense of common interests. Following Ya'alon's remarks, Rabi expounded upon many of the themes by adding that we must develop the proper toolkit to understand the region by understanding the peoples of the region as they understand themselves. This is something that the Moshe Dayan Center views as a priority in our activities, he noted.

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מרוקו: החזרה לאיחוד האפריקני וההתרחקות המתמשכת מהליגה הערבית

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מלך מרוקו מחמד ה-שישי.

בחודש מרץ 2017 התקיים בירדן מפגש הפסגה ה-28 של הליגה הערבית. המנהיג המארח, המלך עבדאללה השני, ערך ביקור מקדים ברבאט בירת מרוקו, שמטרתו העיקרית הייתה לשכנע את מקבילו המרוקני לקחת חלק במאורע. אלא שמלך מרוקו מחמד השישי נעדר בסופו של דבר מהמפגש השנתי עם מנהיגי מדינות ערב, כפי שהוא נוהג לעשות זה למעלה מעשור, במפגן הסתייגות מהתנהלותה של הזירה הבין-ערבית. התרחקותו מזירה זו בלטה השנה במיוחד על רקע פעלתנותו הרבה בזירה האפריקנית, שהגיעה לשיא בנוכחותו ההיסטורית חודשיים קודם לכן בוועידת הפסגה ה-28 של האיחוד האפריקני (AU), שהתקיימה באתיופיה. במסגרת ועידת פסגה זו, חזרה מרוקו להיות חברה מן המניין בארגון הפאן-אפריקני לאחר למעלה משלושים שנות היעדרות.[1]לאור זאת, מאמר זה יבחן את מגמת ההתרחקות של מרוקו מהעולם הערבי בכלל ומהליגה הערבית בפרט, כמו גם את הגורמים למגמה ההפוכה  של התקרבותה למדינות אפריקה וחזרתה לאיחוד האפריקני.

העולם הערבי במשבר, הליגה הערבית חסרת השפעה
התרחקות מרוקו מהזירה הבין-ערבית איננה תופעה חדשה, ולמעשה היא מאפיינת במיוחד את תקופת שלטונו של המלך מחמד השישי, מאז ראשית שנות האלפיים ועד היום. מרוקו הרשמית אינה מרבה להתבטא ולפעול בסוגיות שעל סדר היום בעולם הערבי, דוגמת מלחמות האזרחים בעיראק ובסוריה, המעורבות האיראנית במזרח התיכון או הסוגיה הפלסטינית.[2]מאז שנת 1989 לא אירחה הממלכה אף פסגה של הליגה הערבית, ומחמד השישי נכח באופן אישי בשתי פסגות בלבד, שהאחרונה שבהן הייתה ב-2005. מאז, הוא מעדיף לשגר במקומו את ראשי ממשלתו או את שרי החוץ כנציגי הממלכה במפגשים הבין-ערביים.[3]בשנת 2016 הייתה אמורה מרוקו לארח את ועידת הפסגה השנתית של הליגה הערבית בעיר מרקש, אך בסופו של דבר ביטלה את האירוע. הנימוק למהלך היה, שהליגה איננה מקבלת החלטות מעשיות לפתרון הבעיות הקשות בזירות המשבר השונות של חברותיה, ושהתכנסותה היא בבחינת "מצג שווא של אחדות וסולידריות בקרב מדינות ערב".[4]

מרוקו, אם כן, רואה בליגה הערבית גוף חסר השפעה של ממש, נוכח היריבויות והמתיחויות הפנימיות המאפיינות אותו, אשר העמיקו עוד יותר מאז אירועי "האביב הערבי".[5]בנוסף, מרוקו מסויגת מהדומיננטיות המצרית בליגה הערבית, וניכר כי מאז עלייתו לשלטון של הנשיא עבד אל-פתח אל-סיסי בשנת 2013 היחסים בין שתי המדינות מתוחים למדי. הסיבה העיקרית לכך היא יחסה של קהיר לסוגיה המרכזית ביותר מבחינתה של רבאט - שמירת חבל הסהרה המערבית בריבונותה המלאה של מרוקו והמאבק בתנועת הפוליסריו (POLISARIO), החותרת להתנתקות מהממלכה ולהכרה במדינה עצמאית של תושבי הסהרה.[6]המגעים שנוצרו בין התנועה הבדלנית לבין מצרים, כמו גם ההתקרבות שחלה בין מצרים לבין אלג'יריה, יריבתה המרכזית של מרוקו במרחב המגרבי והפטרונית המרכזית של הפוליסריו, היו למורת רוחה של הממלכה המרוקנית.[7]

לצד זאת, מרוקו מעדיפה להדק את יחסיה הבילטראליים עם מדינות ערביות בהן היא רואה בנות-ברית, ובראשן סעודיה, ירדן ומדינות "המועצה לשיתוף פעולה במפרץ" (משפ"ם/GCC). מסגרת אזורית זו נתפשת בעיניה כאפקטיביות יותר מהליגה הערבית, והיא מרבה לתמוך בפעולות מדיניות וביטחוניות ביוזמת חברותיה - למשל הלחימה בתימן, המאבק למיגור ארגון "המדינה האסלאמית"וכיוצא בזה. מדינות הארגון, מצדן, מעניקות יחס מיוחד למרוקו, ובהיותן מדינות בעלות משאבי טבע כנפט וגז, הן מסייעות לה כלכלית ומשקיעות בתחומה. בנוסף, בניגוד לליגה הערבית, הנמנעת מתמיכה בעמדת מרוקו במשבר הסהרה המערבית, הביעה המשפ"ם תמיכה בשלמותה הטריטוריאלית של הממלכה ובריבונותה באזור זה. תמיכה זו באה לידי ביטוי, בין היתר, בהחלטת רוב מדינות המפרץ לפרוש מהפסגה הערבית-האפריקנית שנערכה בגינאה המשוונית ב-2016, במחאה על נוכחות משלחת מטעם חזית הפוליסריו.[8]  

בסופו של יום, התדרדרות המצב הביטחוני ברבות ממדינות ערב והפילוג העמוק ביניהן, הופכים את המרחב הערבי לבלתי אטרקטיבי מבחינתה של מרוקו, המחפשת להגביר את השפעתה המדינית והכלכלית כשחקנית אזורית מובילה. על כן, היא פונה לזירות גיאוגרפיות אחרות, ובראשן הזירה האפריקנית.

"השיבה הביתה"? - חזרתה של מרוקו לאיחוד האפריקני
כאמור, בפסגה האחרונה של האיחוד האפריקני, שהתקיימה בסוף ינואר, אושרה חזרתה של מרוקו לשורות הארגון ממנו פרשה לפני 33 שנים במחאה על הכרתו בעצמאות ה"רפובליקה הדמוקרטית הערבית הסהראווית" (SADR), עליה הכריזה הפוליסריו. חזרת מרוקו לאיחוד הייתה שיאו של מאמץ דיפלומטי מורכב ורב-שנים מבחינתה, המעיד עד כמה הידוק היחסים עם היבשת הפך סוגיה מרכזית במדיניותה, בהובלתו האישית של מחמד השישי. בנאומו בפני פסגת האיחוד הגדיר המלך המרוקני את אפריקה כביתו והתייחס רבות להידוק הקשרים הכלכליים עם מדינותיה השונות, שבא לידי ביטוי בכאלף הסכמים בילטראליים שנחתמו מאז עלה לשלטון - בתחומי האנרגיה המתחדשת, החקלאות, הבנקאות, התקשורת, ההשכלה ועוד.[9]בהזדמנות אחרת הכריז כי "אפריקה אינה מהווה איום לא לעצמה ולא לאחרים, כי אם הזדמנות לצמיחה מובטחת..."[10]

ואכן, הדיפלומטיה המרוקנית באפריקה לוקחת בחשבון את שיעורי הצמיחה הגבוהים במדינות היבשת ושמה דגש רב על היחסים הכלכליים, תוך מאמץ להרחיב את פעילותה והשקעותיה באזורים שאינם ידועים כאזורי השפעתה המסורתיים. כך, בחודשים שקדמו לפסגה קיים המלך סבבי ביקורים למדינות שונות במזרח, במרכז ובדרום היבשת, בהן כאלו שהיו תחת שלטון והשפעה בריטיים. בניגוד למדינות מערב-אפריקה הפרנקופוניות והקרובות גיאוגרפית, עד כה לא היו למרוקו יחסים הדוקים עם מדינות אלו.[11]במסגרת ביקורי המלך בנובמבר 2016 בניגריה ובאתיופיה, שהנן שתיים מן המדינות המרכזיות באפריקה, נחתמו בינן לבין מרוקו הסכמים חשובים במיוחד: הסכם אסטרטגי להנחת צינור גז בין ניגריה לבין מרוקו, שיעבור בין כמה מדינות במערב היבשת ויגיע בסופו של דבר לאירופה, והסכם להקמת מתחם לייצור דשנים באתיופיה, שיהיה השני בגודלו ביבשת, בהובלת חברת הפוספסט הממשלתית של מרוקו.[12]

אולם, מעבר להיבט הכלכלי, להרחבת ההשפעה המרוקנית ביבשת יש היבט פוליטי מובהק. חלק ניכר מהמדינות בהן ביקר המלך נטו לתמוך בפוליסריו והיו מקורבות לאלג'יריה, כך שביקוריו נועדו בראש ובראשונה לגרום להן לבחון מחדש את גישתן למשבר הסהרה המערבית. במבחן התוצאה המיידי מהלכיה של מרוקו בהחלט נחלו הצלחה: רוב ברור של 39 מתוך 53 המדינות החברות באיחוד הצביע בעד חזרתה לשורותיו; רק עשר מדינות, ובראשן אלג'יריה ודרום אפריקה, הצביעו נגד, ועוד ארבע מדינות נמנעו.[13]הממלכה הפגינה מידה רבה של גמישות ונכונות לפשרה טקטית, שכן בניגוד לעבר היא לא התנתה את חזרתה לאיחוד בסילוקה של "המדינה הסהרוואית". עם זאת, היא בפירוש לא וויתרה על שאיפתה לכך, ויש להניח שתוסיף לפעול לשחיקת הלגיטימציה של ישות זו מתוך עמדת הכוח של מדינה חברה באיחוד.

סבב ביקורים נוסף של מחמד השישי, מיד עם תום הפסגה, נועד להעביר מסר פוליטי ברור בכיוון זה.[14]הוא החל בדרום-סודאן, המדינה הצעירה ביבשת, שתומכי הפוליסריו ראו בהתנתקותה מסודאן ב-2011 תקדים חיובי של חבל ארץ אפריקני שזכה לעצמאות בתום תהליך של הידברות והסכמה עם מדינת האם. אולם דווקא דרום-סודאן הפכה בסופו של דבר לפרו-מרוקנית, כפי שבא לידי ביטוי בהצהרת נשיאה סלבה קיר (Kiir), כי אין מקום להשוואה בין סוגיית הסהרה המערבית לבין הרקע והנסיבות שהובילו לעצמאות ארצו. העובדה שרבאט מוכנה לסייע ולהשקיע בדרום-סודאן, השקועה במלחמת אזרחים וסובלת ממשבר הומניטארי חריף, ללא ספק תרמה לנכונותה של מדינה זו להגן על הנרטיב המרוקני בנוגע למשבר הסהרה המערבית.[15]

דעיכתו של האיחוד המגרבי, חתירתה של מרוקו להצטרף ל-ECOWAS
במסגרת נאומו של המלך בפני מנהיגי אפריקה בוועידת הפסגה הוא שב והביע את אכזבתו הקשה מחוסר תפקודו של "איחוד מדינות המגרב הערבי" (AMU), הארגון האזורי של מדינות המגרב, ורמז בבירור למתיחות הקשה בין ארצו לבין אלג'יריה, שאינה מאפשרת להן לפעול בשיתוף פעולה ומובילה לשיתוקו. מנגד, הוא שיבח את תפקודה המוצלח של "הקהילה הכלכלית של מדינות מערב אפריקה" (ECOWAS), תוך הדגשת היקף הסחר המרשים בין המדינות החברות בה, נוסף על התנועה החופשית של אנשים, סחורות והון.[16]ברוח זו, כמה חודשים לאחר חזרת מרוקו לאיחוד האפריקני, היא הגישה בקשה להפוך ממשקיפה בארגון התת-אזורי לחברה מן המניין בו. זאת, נוכח קרבתה הגיאוגרפית, השקעותיה וקשריה הבילטראליים ההדוקים עם מדינות רבות החברות בו, אך בעיקר בשל הצורך שלה למצוא חלופה לאיחוד המגרבי.[17]

נשיא אלג'יריה עבד אל-עזיז בותפליקה, מצדו, כפר בטענות המרוקניות על "מותו של איחוד מדינות המגרב"וקרא לחברותיו להשקיע מאמצים בשיקומו.[18]יותר מכל, ניכר כי אלג'יריה מוטרדת מאד מהרחבת השפעתה של שכנתה-יריבתה באפריקה בכלל, ובמערב אפריקה בפרט, כפי שבא לידי ביטוי בהגדרתה את החתירה המרוקנית להצטרפות ל-ECOWAS כ"רעידת אדמה כלכלית וגיאופוליטית".[19]מעבר לאינטרסים הביטחוניים של אלג'יריה, בעיקר באזור הסאהל, היא חוששת משחיקת מעמדה כשחקנית כלכלית במרחב. הלכה למעשה, הסכם הנחת צינור הגז בין ניגריה לבין מרוקו שהוזכר לעיל הוא עדות ברורה למגמה זו, שכן המגעים שניהלה אלג'יריה בשנים עברו להשגת הסכם דומה, קרי להנחת צינור גז בינה לבין ניגריה - נחלו כישלון.[20]

יחסי החוץ של מרוקו בסימן ניהול משבר הסהרה המערבית - מבט לעתיד
בסיכומו של דבר, ניהול משבר הסהרה המערבית היה, נותר ויוסיף להיות המרכיב המרכזי ביחסי החוץ של מרוקו הן עם העולם הערבי והן עם מדינות אפריקה, ובכלל. הזירה הבין-ערבית אינה הבמה המרכזית לשמירת האינטרסים המרוקנים בהקשר זה .והמשברים הביטחוניים ברבות ממדינות ערב תורמים למגמה המתמשכת של התרחקות מרוקו מהפוליטיקה הערבית בכלל, ומהליגה הערבית בהובלת מצרים בפרט. אפריקה שמדרום לסהרה, לעומת זאת, היא הזירה העיקרית לפעילות ענפה בנושא הסהרה המערבית, ועל כן משקיעה בה רבאט את עיקר מאמציה. כמו כן, נראה כי בניגוד לליגה הערבית, האיחוד האפריקני נתפש בעיניה כארגון רב השפעה, חרף העובדה שגם הוא מתאפיין ביריבויות ומחנאות.[21]

חזרתה של מרוקו לאיחוד מהווה שינוי בדפוסי הדיפלומטיה של הממלכה, החותרת כיום לשנות מבפנים את יחס הארגון למשבר הסהרה ולתנועת הפוליסריו, במקום להחרימו כפי שעשתה עד כה. זאת, במקביל להידוק הקשרים הבילטראליים והרחבת אזורי ההשפעה באפריקה, בדגש על הידוק הקשרים הכלכליים, נוכח מגמת הצמיחה הכללית של יבשת. לעת עתה נוחלת מרוקו הצלחות, אך סביר להניח שיריבותיה האזוריות, ובראשן אלג'יריה, יפעלו לסיכול מהלכיה באיחוד האפריקני ולא יאפשרו את סילוקה של המדינה הסהארווית משורותיו.

אילת לוי היא בעלת תואר שני בהיסטוריה של המזרח התיכון ואפריקה מאוניברסיטת תל אביב, העוסקת במחקר מדיני-חברתי של צפון אפריקה והמזרח התיכון.

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Source: CIA World Factbook

In April and May 2017, as tension mounted on the border between Israel and Gaza, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO) all issued reports on the West Bank and Gaza. These included analyses of economic and social conditions in the region and the UNSCO report also examined effects of the conflict between the Palestinian Authority, controlled by Fatah in Ramallah, and Hamas and its government in Gaza. These developments should be seen in their historical context.

Following the first Intifada, which began in Gaza in December 1987, exports, imports, and labor flows from Gaza to Israel fell. This effect intensified after 1991 as a result of a gradual closing of Gaza from Israel and from the West Bank. The process that began with the closure of the Palestinian territories during the Gulf War of 1991, gathered momentum later with additional and longer closures over time, culminating in an almost complete closure in 2006.

Following the withdrawal of Israeli settlers and armed forces from Gaza in 2005, Palestinians from Gaza were no longer allowed to work in Israel. This reduced per capita income sharply because those Palestinians who found alternative employment in Gaza earned less, in a much less productive economy. The decline of productivity and earnings, along with the rise of unemployment, meant that poverty increased dramatically.

A study conducted by the Aix Group (a Palestinian-Israeli NGO) identified two main obstacles to economic growth. The first was the restriction on the movement of goods and people caused by checkpoints, walls, fences, siege, and similar measures. The second was the restrictions on investment, which were both administrative and a result of high risk due to the frequent outbursts of hostilities, both of which deter investments. These obstacles have been much greater in Gaza than in the West Bank. The closure has had effects on agriculture, water supply, and electricity production. According to a World Bank report, by the end of 2008 approximately 50 percent of households lacked running water due to damage incurred during the war in 2008-2009. This damage was never completely fixed due to restrictions on the entry of construction materials. In addition, military operations caused immense damage to capital equipment and infrastructure and deterred new investments. The wars of 2008-2009 and 2012 resulted in damage that had not been repaired prior to the conflict in 2014. The 2014 war was the longest and the most devastating in Gaza since 1967 (See: Iqtisadi, August 2014).

Israel’s Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) has noted another factor that is hurting the economy: Hamas, that has ruled Gaza since 2007. Since the 2014 war, Hamas has allocated at least $120 million to the construction of tunnels designed for attacking Israel and for smuggling. Concrete has been used to build the tunnels at the expense of civilian reconstruction. This activity endangered residents, and electricity has been used to build and light the tunnels 24 hours a day, while hospitals and private homes suffer constant power shortages. In 2016, 25 tunnels collapsed, killing 21 Hamas operatives and injuring many more.

Hamas imposes payments of almost $200 on imports of furniture from Israel into Gaza through the Kerem Shalom Crossing (on Gaza’s southern border with Israel), while it costs $80 to smuggle a suitcase through the tunnels between Gaza and Egypt. There is a $27 toll for trucks using through Salah al-Din road, which crosses through the Gaza Strip. These are part of Hamas’ system of taxes. In recent years, Hamas has begun to rely increasingly on domestic sources of income. It collects some $100 million in taxes each month, most of which is used to pay Hamas official’s salaries. Hamas has constantly increased taxes while evaluating traders’ responses to these measures in order to silence opposition to the taxation. After its takeover of the Gaza in 2007, Hamas generated funds by taxing trade through tunnels used to smuggle goods from Israel and Egypt, but had difficulties alleviating the economic hardships. The situation deteriorated following the Arab Spring in 2011 and reached a low point during the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt in July of 2013. During this period, Hamas decided to impose more taxes on Gaza residents as foreign aid and smuggling revenues declined.

Several months later, in April 2015, Hamas promoted a new economic plan that included a so-called “solidarity tax.” Hamas has claimed that this new tax will help the poor of Gaza, but in practice, most of the profits from the taxes have been used to fund the salaries of Hamas’s workers. At the same time, Hamas has been imposing new taxes on the Strip’s residents, both directly and indirectly, in addition to increasing other taxes.

The most recent burden that Hamas has imposed on Gazans was to force merchants to pay all their taxes and debts before being allowed to leave the Strip. In February of 2017, Hamas released a new directive regarding the exit of businessmen and merchants from the Gaza Strip through Erez Crossing (on the southern border with Egypt) and Rafah (on the Southern border with Egypt). Businessmen and merchants now had to provide official documentation stating that they had settled their payments and debts with the government and local authorities before leaving the Strip. In addition, Hamas recently attempted to impose new taxes on construction materials, but the move was blocked after rising resentment by Gaza’s importers and Israel’s threat to ban all imports of construction goods to the Gaza Strip. Hamas is now planning to increase taxes in order to finance salary payments. In 2016, Hamas’ average monthly earning from taxation stood at $17 million, and by February 2017, tax revenues reached $28 million.

The tax mechanism that Hamas has created directly influences the lives of Gaza residents. For example, customs fees along with a special tax on cigarettes and tobacco products, which are smuggled through the tunnels, equal 50 percent of the total price. The customs fee paid for a pack of cigarettes is $1.50, and this means Hamas earns up to $10 million a month from cigarette smokers. In addition, Hamas collects taxes at the crossings between Israel and the Gaza Strip. At the Erez Crossing, Hamas collects various taxes, beginning with incoming mail, and including a toll for driving to and from the crossing. These taxes have even affected real estate as well. Not only is the rate of construction in Gaza down, and not rising as expected, but Hamas’ so called Land Authority collects a 17 percent tax from real estate agents on each deal.

By July 2016 Gaza’s population had reached an estimated at 1.75 million and was increasing at a rate of 2.9 percent a year, one of the fastest growth rates in the world. Almost 67 percent of the population was aged 0-24 years, and the crucial labor market entry age group of 15-24 year-olds accounted for 21 percent of the total population. These facts alone present a major challenge because the region is very densely populated and lacks water. These challenges are, of course, only part of the region’s problems, and are essentially political. The Gaza Strip’s territory is only 365 square kilometers (141 square miles) making it one of the most densely populated places on earth.

Since Hamas took over, there has been a serious deterioration in key socio-economic indicators. During the decade since 2007, the average GDP growth rate in Gaza was 2.8 percent compared to 6.9 percent in the West Bank. As Gaza’s average GDP growth rate was lower than that of the population growth rate, per capita real GDP in Gaza declined. This decline amounted to 5.3 percent from 2006 to 2016, while per capital real GDP grew by 48.5 percent in the West Bank during the same period, increasing the gap in living standards between the two areas. Gaza’s economic performance has been closely linked to developments in Israeli closure policies, as well as tensions with Hamas and the wars of 2008-9, 2012, and 2014. Real GDP in Gaza fell in 2007, 2008, and 2014. The contraction of economic activity was particularly significant in 2014 when real GDP fell by over 15 percent due to hostilities (See Figures 1 and 2). Inflow of foreign aid for reconstruction after each escalation of hostilities helped boost Gaza’s growth rate but only temporarily. The poverty rate has reached about 40 percent and is much worse than in the West Bank.

Figure 1

GDP Growth in the Palestinian Territories, 1995-2016

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Source: World Bank

Figure 1 shows the importance of foreign aid to the Palestinian economy. The decline in aid that started in 2012 was followed by a slowdown in growth that occurred in the West Bank as well as in Gaza and preceded the 2014 war. In October 2014, there was an international conference in Cairo designed to generate aid for reconstruction in Gaza after the war. By 2016, a total of $1.796 billion had been disbursed, 51 percent of the amount pledged. Of this amount only $670 million was allocated to priorities listed in the Gaza Recovery Framework and this covered only 17 percent of recovery needs. Table 1 shows how donors outside the Middle East lived up to their commitments much more than those in the region.

Table 1

Disbursement Status by Donor of Support to Gaza pledged at the Cairo Conference to End 2016

($ millions, larger donors only)

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Source: World Bank

Figure 2 shows that national income per capita in Gaza was about $1,000, less than half that in the West Bank and less than a thirtieth of the level in Israel.

Figure 2

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Source: World Bank

Gaza’s productive sectors have been particularly hard hit and their share in GDP has been declining. Between 2006 and 2016, the share of agriculture, forestry, and fishing in GDP declined from 6.1 to 4.1 percent, and the share of mining, manufacturing, electricity, and water declined from 11.9 to 8.4 percent. The GDP growth rate resulted from the expansion of construction, wholesale and retail trade, services, as well as public administration and defense. In 2016, public administration and defense accounted for nearly a third of Gaza’s economy. As will be seen, the weight of public administration and defense in the economy has had major political consequences in Palestinian politics.

As a result of weak economic performance, the unemployment rate in Gaza rose from 32 percent during the first quarter of 2006 to 41 percent in the last quarter of 2016, resulting in 203,000 unemployed at the end of 2016. The unemployment rate has been highly volatile over the past decade, reflecting closures of the borders with Israel and Egypt, escalation of hostilities, and reconstruction. Unemployment peaked in the third quarter of 2014 reaching 47 percent at the height of the hostilities. This also reflected seasonal fluctuations in demand for labor in farming and fishing.

The rise in unemployment has been most severe among youth and women. Between the first quarter of 2006 and the last quarter of 2016, the unemployment rate for 20-24 year-olds increased by nearly 10 percentage points (from 50.6% to 60.3%) while that of 25-29 year-olds increased by close to 16 percentage points from (36.3% to 52.1%). In the same period, the unemployment rate for women increased from 35.1 to 64.4 percent, with the gap between men and women steadily increasing over the decade.

At the end of April 2017, The Palestinian Authority (PA) informed Israel that it would stop paying for the electricity that Israel supplies to the Gaza Strip. This was part of an attempt to reassert control after ten years of Hamas rule. The population of Gaza suffers acute power shortages, with the supply of electricity rationed to about four hours a day. As its own power station is out of commission, Gaza is dependent on electricity supplied by Israel, and on a limited, and less reliable, supply from Egypt. According to the Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, Israel supplies Gaza with more than half of its annual electricity needs (125 megawatts) at a monthly cost of about $11 million.

In 2007, 58,000 civil servants worked in Gaza. At that time, the PA ordered its Gaza employees to stop going to work as violence erupted between the PA and Hamas. This led Hamas to appoint its own civil servants to run the ministries. Since 2007, the PA has continued to pay Gaza civil service salaries despite them not working, but in April 2017, it announced a salary cut of between 30 and 50 percent for civil servants there. This sparked a public outcry and tens of thousands began to protest.

According to the UNSCO, the political situation has deteriorated over the last year:

“Despite the practical recommendations proposed by the Middle East Quartet in July 2016 the period witnessed a surge in Israeli settlement-related activity and a continued high rate of demolitions in Palestinian and Bedouin communities at risk of forcible transfer in Area C of the West Bank, continuing acts of terror and violence against civilians, signs of a deepening political Palestinian rift between Gaza and the West Bank, and continued military build-up and firing of rockets by Hamas and extremist groups in Gaza. … In Gaza, the security situation remained volatile with the potential for further escalation on the rise. Extremists launched a number of rockets towards Israel without causing injuries or damages. Israel generally responded to the rocket launchings with airstrikes and artillery fire, mainly targeting military positions of Hamas.

Municipal elections originally set for October 2016 were postponed … for four months after the Palestinian High Court ruled against the Government’s arrangement for conducting the elections in Gaza. In January, the Palestinian Government established a designated electoral court to resolve the issue of the “illegal” courts in Gaza, as highlighted by the High Court. Hamas rejected this decision and expressed its dissatisfaction with the Government’s failure to hold the municipal elections in 2016. As a result, preparations are underway for municipal elections that are expected to be held exclusively in the West Bank on 13 May 2017, as agreement on the mechanics of holding the elections in Gaza and Ramallah was not reached.

Meanwhile, continuing efforts to reconcile Fatah and Hamas have failed. In October 2016 President Abbas met with Hamas Politburo Chairman Mashal in Qatar. In January 2017, representatives of PLO, Hamas and Islamic Jihad agreed in a meeting in Beirut in January on the need to start consultations to form a national unity government that would work to implement previous reconciliation deals, end the Palestinian division and prepare general elections. Also in that month, Russia hosted Palestinian factions in an effort to achieve reconciliation. Despite these meetings, the two sides were unable to agree on unity. In another setback to achieving unity, Hamas established the so-called Administrative Committee, a parallel institution to run local ministries in Gaza on 16 March 2017. The Palestinian Authority (PA) was reportedly not consulted about the move and, in a statement, rejected any formula that administers ministries in Gaza independently from the Government of National Consensus. Disputes between the PA and Hamas over responsibilities in Gaza aggravated the electricity crisis in the Strip.”

Israel has been blamed by many for the current situation because it exercises control on the flow of goods, services, and people crossing its border into Gaza. This control should be seen in the context of constant military conflict in the region, including three wars. Israel has banned trade in items that it considers “dual use;” materials that it believes could be used to contribute to a military threat. But the problem is that nearly everything can be dual use. Electricity is used to drill tunnels designed for military attacks by Hamas on Israel and so it can be considered dual use. On the other hand, the electricity crisis in Gaza, that also affects the supply of water, is considered by some to be one of the main factors behind the desperation felt by so many Gazans. They not only despair about the future, but find the current conditions intolerable. People with nothing to lose can be tempted by extremists.

Israel has not attempted, in any of the three rounds of fighting, to remove the Hamas from power. Some say that this is because it fears that Hamas would be replaced by even more extremist Islamist groups, while others say that it is in Israel’s interest that Hamas does not unify with Fatah and form a more powerful Palestinian Authority. Hamas will do all it can to remain in power and if this means using desperately needed resources for war or to prepare for war, then it will not hesitate to do so, as it has done so often in the past. The Palestinian population in Gaza is therefore politically trapped and their economic fate is an outcome of a conflict that has at least three sides.

On 24 May 2017, the Sephardi Voices Project was officially launched as part of the MDC's Program for the Study of Jews in Arab Lands. This project represents a vital collaboration between the MDC at Tel Aviv University and Sephardi Voices, Inc., and was initiated by board members of the Canadian Friends of Tel Aviv University - Ottawa, Quebec, and Atlantic Canada, and its Executive Director, Mr. Sharon Fraenkel. The SV Project will enable the collection, archiving, and cataloging of thousands of oral histories from those who were forced to leave their homes in Arab countries in the years following the establishment of the State of Israel.

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MDC Director Prof. Uzi Rabi and Sephardi Voices President Dr. Henry Green sign the Memorandum of Understanding launching the project.

Head of Africa Research Dr. Irit Back was interviewed on Israel Public Broadcasting Corporation "Kan," where she discussed the current situation in the Central African Republic. In Hebrew.

On 29 May 2017, the Forum on Kurdish Society, History and Culture will host guest speaker Dr. David Pollock, Kaufman fellow at The Washington Institute, for a discussion on the relationship between the Kurds, the United States, and Turkey.  In English, Gilman 133 @ 1400.  Spaces are limited.

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Dr. David Pollock

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President Trump’s trip to Saudi Arabia did not, as some expected, result in an announcement of an “Arab NATO.”[1] Nevertheless, the May 20-21 Riyadh Summit, which brought more than 50 Arab and Muslim leaders to Saudi Arabia, was intended to show American support for the Saudi regional security agenda that is focused on confronting Iran and the Islamic State. Observers were quick to draw comparisons between a “Riyadh Pact” and the 1955 Baghdad Pact, which facilitated regional security cooperation between the U.S. and U.K. and their pro-Western regional allies — Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and Iran — in an effort to contain communism and Arab nationalism. While the commentator Faisal Al Yafai favorably characterized the gathering as a first step “toward a more formidable defense posture that will allow cooler heads to prevail,” the historian Rashid Khalidi argued that “Trump’s Arab Nato would be a terrible mistake.”[2] Saudi officials, for their part, viewed Trump’s visit as a vital “reset” of U.S.- Saudi bilateral relations and “a symbol that Washington aimed to be once again a bedrock for the kingdom and its allies.”[3] However, the hint of something more ambitious was suggested by Saudi foreign minister Adel al-Jubeir’s reference to “increasing defense capabilities” and “working on a defense architecture for the region – initially between our two countries and then looking at how other countries can join.”[4] 

The U.S.- Saudi reset reflected a mutual desire to undo the the Obama Administration’s efforts[5] to promote “geopolitical equilibrium” between Iran and the Sunni Arab States in the region.[6] From the Saudi perspective, “Iran took the United States hostage” during Obama’s drive for a nuclear agreement in his second term, which allowed Iran a free hand to sow chaos in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen and created the worst tragedy “in the region’s history.”[7] At the Riyadh Summit, King Salman referred to Iran as the spearhead of global terrorism and enumerated its “expansionist ambitions, criminal practices, interferences in the internal affairs of other countries, flagrant violations of the international law, and violations of the principles of good-neighborliness, coexistence and mutual respect.”[8] Trump was warmly received in Riyadh, because, in contrast to Obama’s conciliatory approach toward Iran, he was openly confrontational in his speech at the summit. Echoing Saudi statements, Trump declared:

From Lebanon to Iraq to Yemen, Iran funds, arms, and trains terrorists, militias, and other extremist groups that spread destruction and chaos across the region. For decades, Iran has fueled the fires of sectarian conflict and terror.[9]

Trump also explicitly called on the international community to isolate Iran and deny it funding for terrorism.[10] While Trump’s new approach to Iran may not be particularly surprising, what makes the Riyadh Summit much more than a “reset” or simply a return to the “status quo” in the U.S.- Saudi relationship is the Saudi aspiration to play a more assertive and forceful leadership role in the region.

Saudi intellectual Khalid al-Dakhil, who is known for his independent views, praised King Salman for tackling Iranian behavior head-on with clear and unambiguous language. He argued that in the past Arab states have tried to conciliate Iran and avoid confronting it with the reality of its dangerous sectarian policies, fearing that they too would be painted with the sectarian brush. However, Dakhil claimed hardliners in Iran capitalized on Arab quiescence and implemented their sectarian policies, knowing that Arab states would be hesitant to confront them on it. Here Dakhil is alluding to King Salman’s statement that “The Iranian regime erroneously thought that our silence a sign of weakness and our wisdom a retreat.”[11] Dakhil argued that the time has come to distinguish between the Iranian state’s active exploitation of sectarian differences in the region and the Arab fear of facing-up to the weight of its centuries-old sectarian culture.[12]

To many, Dakhil’s distinction may sound like a specious argument, particularly coming from a Saudi subject. After all, Saudi legitimacy rests, in part, on its historical and ongoing ties to the Al Shaykh family and Wahhabi Islam, which has a history of sectarian enmity toward Shiʿis and Muslims who do not share the Wahhabi creed. Some may find it ironic that Dakhil is arguing that it is Iran rather than the Saudi government that is using sectarianism and Islam as a tool for political aggrandizement. Nevertheless, the distinction Dakhil is drawing, while debatable, is important. He is saying that while Islam is a source of legitimacy and authority for the Saudi royal family, the Saudi state does not use sectarianism as an instrument of power projection or subversion. He further claims that confronting Sunni terror and extremism without confronting Shiʿi terror is also a form of sectarianism.

To be sure, Saudi declarations about confronting extremism should be treated with a heavy dose of circumspection.[13] The Saudis have been making strides in this area for some time now, but the process is too slow to be felt, according to the analyst Hassan Hassan. He argues that the Kingdom should systematically “pushback against clerics who spew sectarian hatred at home”[14] and embrace the “holistic” approach to combating extremism proposed by Jordan’s King Abdullah in 2006 and reaffirmed in his speech at the Riyadh Summit.[15]

In order to play a more forceful leadership role, the Saudis are also keen to continue augmenting their military capabilities. The unprecedented size of the U.S.- Saudi economic deals that were announced during Trump’s visit is another indication that the Riyadh Summit is more than simply a post-Obama reset of bilateral ties. Their value is expected to be more than $300 billion, and the arms package alone is estimated to exceed more than $100 billion, which is approximately 15 percent of total Saudi Gross Domestic Product (GDP).[16]

Since the 1970s, the Saudis have used massive arms deals as a means to recycle their petrodollars and cement their security alliances with Western military powers.[17] Some would argue that the Saudis were outsourcing their national security, but in reality the Saudis were forced to seek new modes of security in the period that followed the British military withdrawal from the region in 1971. In line with this logic, these enormous arms deals were viewed in Saudi Arabia as a symbol of the U.S.’s commitment to Saudi security. There was a perception that the Saudis purchased the West’s most advanced military technology without clear operational objectives and often struggled to integrate all of its advanced hardware into its military operations.[18]

However, what makes the arms package different this time around, beyond its unprecedented size and scope, is that the Saudi military is actively engaged in ongoing military operations in Yemen. Since March 2015, and for the first time in the kingdom’s history,[19] Saudi Arabia is independently projecting force beyond its borders in an attempt to roll-back the Iranian-backed Houthi insurgency in Yemen. While the Saudi military has had mixed success in Yemen,[20] it is the effort to independently use its military to achieve its security objectives that is new and significant, indicating an important shift to a more self-reliant Saudi strategic culture.[21]

The discussion of an “Arab NATO,” while perhaps premature, and Adel al-Jubeir’s references to a new regional “defense architecture” are a clear indication of Saudi ambitions. To that end, the U.S.- Saudi arms package will contribute to developing an indigenous Saudi military-industrial complex. Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030” plan for economic development calls for manufacturing half of Saudi armaments domestically.[22] The establishment of the Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI), which will be modeled on the multi-billion dollar Saudi petrochemical giant SABIC, will provide the kingdom with a private sector vehicle for U.S. technology transfer and joint ventures.[23] Further, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, two of the American companies profiting from the new arms deals, will be creating a large numbers of jobs in Saudi Arabia to assemble, modernize, and maintain much of the advanced military hardware and weapons systems the Saudis are purchasing.[24]

Perhaps the most intriguing immediate development to come out of the Riyadh Summit was the declared intent to bolster the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria with a 34,000 strong reserve force being raised by the Saudi-led “Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism.”[25] The Riyadh Declaration noted that these forces would be used “to support operations against terrorist organizations in Iraq and Syria when needed.”[26] The Trump administration has not announced its strategy for combating the Islamic State, but the declarations that came out of the Riyadh Summit suggest that the U.S. may have plans to partner with the Saudi-led Islamic Military Alliance in stabilizing the Sunni populated territories of eastern Syria and western Iraq after the Islamic State has been defeated.

Prince Turki al-Faisal, the former Saudi security chief, writing in the aftermath of the Riyadh Summit, embraced Trump’s regional agenda, but pointed out that everyone will be looking for the “action that will bring us all out of the rut of where we are.”[27] The U.S. presidential visit certainly restored Saudi confidence in relationship that had frayed during the Obama years.[28] But it is “Actions,” as Turki reminded, that “speak louder than words.”[29]

Brandon Friedman is a Researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies (MDC), Tel Aviv University.

*This piece was commissioned by the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) and first published and distributed by FPRI on May 30.  My thanks to FPRI’s President, Alan Luxenberg, for allowing this piece to be republishedhere.